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The purpose of this thesis is to explore the means of knowledge acquisition put 
forward in Imām Abu Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s theory of knowledge, with particular focus on 
those elements that would, today, be deemed prelogical in light of modern epistemic 
convictions. I will argue that such means are not prelogical or irrational, as they have 
been described in several places, but are the natural epistemic dimension of an extensive 
and sophisticated metaphysical theology that differs significantly from the metaphysical 
outlook (or lack thereof) that motivates such pejorative labeling. I will further argue that 
Imām al-Ghazālī’s inclusion of these means is not a symptom of intellectual weakness or 
ritualistic bias, but a valuable illustration of the wholistic nature of Islamic thought, in 
which the metaphysical, the physical, the epistemological, and the ethical are all treated 
as inextricable facets of existence whose separating boundaries are, in many cases, 
impossible to delineate. Thus, Imām al-Ghazālī’s conviction that seekers of knowledge 
should conduct their search through metaphysical, spiritual, and ritualistic means does 
not detract from, but rather lends coherence and strength to his theory of knowledge, 
which has become canon within the vast intellectual tradition of his faith.     
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The concerns of the student are universal concerns, bearing great importance for 
all of humanity. This is because education constitutes the primary means by which 
humans grow and develop both intellectually and morally, thus its strength or weakness 
determines the health of human societies. The foremost of the concerns of the student is 
the question of how we learn, which cannot be answered without first addressing the 
plethora of epistemic matters that underlie it. Surely every great thinker must at least 
consider the fundamental issues related to knowing and learning before allowing 
themselves to move on to other philosophical exertions, where they may then assert 
knowledge. Historically, many such thinkers have spent a good deal of time and a 
considerable amount of space in their written work trying to come to conclusions on and 
express their own epistemological understanding before exploring other topics. Amongst 
them is Imām Abu Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, a genius and perhaps the most influential educator 
of his era, whose intellectual light has served to illuminate minds for centuries.  
The entirety of Imām al-Ghazālī’s work can be viewed as an educational project: 
a groundbreaking and comprehensive effort to reform the way Muslims act by reviving 
the pathways by which they attain knowledge. Though, as far as I am aware, he has no 
known works that are exclusively devoted to the philosophy of education, pedagogical 
discussions intersperse his works and concerns about education seem to be at the 
forefront of his mind. In the process of his own intellectual growth, as he describes it in 
his autobiography, Al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl wa’l-Mufṣiḥ bi’l-Aḥwāl, it is clear that he 
took epistemology to be the first step of philosophical understanding. All this stands to 
emphasize the significance of the question of what knowledge is and how it is acquired, 
both in general and in his works in particular.  
As a student, I myself have been consumed by these questions, which do not seem 
to die down if they are not granted serious consideration. For this reason, I took the 
opportunity to explore them by making them the focus of my thesis research. I then made 
the locale of my research the works of one who might have something significant to 
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contribute in the way of answering them. Imām al-Ghazālī’s influence on Islamic thought 
is undeniable; it was my intention to open myself up to his works and allow that influence 
to work on me by exploring the vast fields of thought that his works cover. The texts I 
consumed were extremely enriching, yet, over the course of my research, I found that in 
their modern reception, sometimes even by their translators, a disservice was sometimes 
done to his pedagogical ideas in particular. I came across the terms “irrational” and 
“prelogical” and felt it necessary, in my exploration of these ideas, to address criticism 
along such lines. Thus the first goal of my work was to learn through my readings, the 
second to share my findings as I had formulated them. The third was this act defense - 
though it is perhaps unnecessary, as the works have spoken for themselves for nearly a 
millennium.  
I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Recep Şentürk, who, on top of providing his 
utmost support in this project and throughout my time at the Alliance of Civilizations 
Institute, was the cause of my coming to Turkey to study and thus the door to all of my 
learning here. Repaying the value of even one priceless letter of what I have learned due 
to his efforts and through my many wonderful teachers is beyond my ability, so I must 
declare bankruptcy from the vast debt that I owe, and offer these humble thanks and 
apologies for my inadequacies as a student instead. Thanks are due to my teachers at the 
Institute, as well as to the administrative staff, for their kind guidance these past few 
years. I would also like to thank my entire family, whose support renders my life as a 
student possible, and to whose prayers I owe my prospering therein. Most importantly, I 
thank my wonderful parents, whose upbringing of myself and my siblings has been a 
blessing above all blessings, and my sisters and brother, who are my closest and most 
beloved companions in life. I hope this work proffers of some small benefit, and all 
success is from Him.  
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Istanbul, 2017  
 االلررححييمم٬،  االلححممدد للللهه االلذذيي ففضضّلل ببننيي آآددمم ببااللععللمم ووااللععمملل ععللىى ججممييعع االلععااللمم٬،ببسسمم االلللهه االلررححممنن 
  ووااللصصللااةة ووااللسسللاامم ععللىى ممححممدد سسييدد االلععرربب ووااللععججمم ووععللىى آآللهه ووأأصصححااببهه ييننااببييعع االلععللوومم ووااللححككمم







A.H. : Anno Hegirae (after Hijra)  
Diss. : Dissertation 
Ibid. : In the same source 
Repr. :         Reprint 
 االلررححييمم٬،  االلححممدد للللهه االلذذيي ففضضّلل ببننيي آآددمم ببااللععللمم ووااللععمملل ععللىى ججممييعع االلععااللمم٬،ببسسمم االلللهه االلررححممنن 
  ووااللصصللااةة ووااللسسللاامم ععللىى ممححممدد سسييدد االلععرربب ووااللععججمم ووععللىى آآللهه ووأأصصححااببهه ييننااببييعع االلععللوومم ووااللححككمم




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Imām al-Ghazālī............................................................................................................................. 4	  
Biographical Background............................................................................................................ 4 
A Mission of Revival .................................................................................................................... 7 
An Indelible Impact.................................................................................................................... 11 
Disclaimers 
Representation is Relative.......................................................................................................... 13 
Caution around Linguistic and Terminological Usages............................................................ 13 
Imām al-Ghazālī’s Writings are Motivated by his Agenda of Revival ...................................... 15 
“Is” Statements that are not Ontological .................................................................................. 16 
CHAPTER ONE: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF KNOWLEDGE IN ISLAM 
1.1.   The Normative Nature of Knowledge and Learning ....................................................... 20	  
1.1.1.   In Islam, all Acts are Normative .................................................................................... 20 
1.1.2.   Knowledge and Learning are Normative Because they are a Means to Proper Conduct 
in all Other Acts ......................................................................................................................... 20 
1.1.3.   The Act of Seeking Knowledge as Worship.................................................................... 22 
1.1.4.   The Act of Seeking Knowledge as an Ethical Pursuit.................................................... 23 
1.2.   Knowledge as Both Means and End.................................................................................. 25	  
1.2.1.   Imām al-Ghazālī’s System of Valuation ........................................................................ 25 
1.3.   Why We Ought to Examine Educational Philosophy in Islam....................................... 27	  
1.3.1.  Islamic Theories of Knowledge and Education Remain Largely Ignored in Modern 
Academia.................................................................................................................................... 27 
CHAPTER TWO: COSMOLOGICAL CONTEXT 
2.1.   The Intertwined Corporeal and Spiritual Realms........................................................... 29	  
2.1.1.   Movement Between the Corporeal and Spiritual Realms Constitutes the Path of 
Religious Life ............................................................................................................................. 29 
2.2.   The Heart as the Seat of Knowledge ................................................................................. 30	  
2.2.1.   Four Part Terminological Matrix of the Soul................................................................ 31 
2.3.   The Passage of Knowledge into the Heart ........................................................................ 33	  
2.3.1.   Imām al-Ghazālī’s Spectrum of the Extra-mental and Mental Existence of Intelligibles
.................................................................................................................................................... 33 
2.3.2.   When the Pattern Breaks: Divine Inspiration................................................................ 35 
2.3.3.   Another Way of Understanding the Process of Learning: the Metaphor of the Heart as 
Mirror ........................................................................................................................................ 35 
 االلررححييمم٬،  االلححممدد للللهه االلذذيي ففضضّلل ببننيي آآددمم ببااللععللمم ووااللععمملل ععللىى ججممييعع االلععااللمم٬،ببسسمم االلللهه االلررححممنن 
  ووااللصصللااةة ووااللسسللاامم ععللىى ممححممدد سسييدد االلععرربب ووااللععججمم ووععللىى آآللهه ووأأصصححااببهه ييننااببييعع االلععللوومم ووااللححككمم




2.3.4.   Still Another Useful Metaphor: the Entry of Intelligibles into the Heart from Two Doors
.................................................................................................................................................... 36 
CHAPTER THREE: IMĀM AL-GHAZĀLĪ’S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 
3.1.   What is Knowledge? ........................................................................................................... 38	  
3.1.1.   There are Countless Ways in which Knowledge is Understood .................................... 38 
3.1.2.   True Knowledge is Knowledge of God .......................................................................... 39 
3.2.   The Division of Knowledge into the Knowledge of Conduct and the Knowledge of 
Unveiling ....................................................................................................................................... 39	  
3.2.2.   Imām al-Ghazālī’s Works Primarily Take into Hand the Knowledge of Proper Conduct
.................................................................................................................................................... 42 
3.3.1.   Imām al-Ghazālī’s Criteria in Ranking the Sciences .................................................... 43 
3.3.2.   The Instrumental Sciences ............................................................................................. 44 
3.4.   Metaphors Used to Describe Knowledge .......................................................................... 44	  
3.4.1.   Knowledge is Life........................................................................................................... 44 
3.4.2.   Knowledge is Light ........................................................................................................ 46 
3.4.3.   Knowledge is Happiness ................................................................................................ 46 
3.5.   The Nobility of Knowledge................................................................................................. 47	  
3.5.1.   Mankind’s Intellect Sets him Apart from all of Creation............................................... 47 
3.5.2.   The Relationship between Knowledge and Prophecy .................................................... 48 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE  
4.1.   The Primary Source of Knowledge ................................................................................... 50	  
4.1.1.   God is the Primary Cause of Knowledge Entering the Heart ....................................... 50 
4.2.   The Secondary Sources of Knowledge .............................................................................. 51	  
4.2.1.   Reason............................................................................................................................ 51 
4.2.2.   Revelation ...................................................................................................................... 52 
4.2.3.   Knowledge Must be Sought through Both ..................................................................... 54 
4.3.   Some of the Tertiary Sources of Knowledge .................................................................... 57	  
4.3.1.   Knowledge is Taken from Men ...................................................................................... 57 
4.3.2.   Knowledge is Taken Wherever it is Found .................................................................... 60 
4.3.3.   The Place of Empirical Knowledge in Imām al-Ghazālī’s Epistemology ..................... 61 
CHAPTER FIVE: HOW TO DERIVE KNOWLEDGE FROM ITS SOURCES 
5.1.   Knowledge is Gained by Maintaining the Proper Intentions ......................................... 65	  
5.1.1.   Flawed Intentionality Prevents One from Gaining Knowledge..................................... 65 
5.1.2.   Flawed Intentionality Leads to the Removal of Knowledge from the World ................. 67 
5.1.3.   Flawed Intentionality Causes One’s Knowledge to Count Against One ....................... 68 
5.2.   Knowledge is Gained through Study and Reflection....................................................... 69	  
5.2.1.   Asking Questions............................................................................................................ 69 
 االلررححييمم٬،  االلححممدد للللهه االلذذيي ففضضّلل ببننيي آآددمم ببااللععللمم ووااللععمملل ععللىى ججممييعع االلععااللمم٬،ببسسمم االلللهه االلررححممنن 
  ووااللصصللااةة ووااللسسللاامم ععللىى ممححممدد سسييدد االلععرربب ووااللععججمم ووععللىى آآللهه ووأأصصححااببهه ييننااببييعع االلععللوومم ووااللححككمم




5.2.2.   Debate and its Many Dangers ....................................................................................... 70 
5.2.3.   Beginning Study with What is Easily Understood ......................................................... 72 
5.2.4.   Avoiding Distraction ...................................................................................................... 74 
5.3.   Knowledge is Gained Through Righteousness and Good Character............................. 75	  
5.3.1.   Ethics as a Means of Knowledge Acquisition ................................................................ 75 
5.3.2.   Spiritual Purification as a Means of Knowledge Acquisition........................................ 76 
5.3.3.   Knowledge is Gained Through Reverence for Knowledge ............................................ 80 
5.3.4.   Knowledge is gained through Humility ......................................................................... 84 
5.4.2.   Moderation in Everything .............................................................................................. 87 
5.4.3.   Little Speech................................................................................................................... 90 
5.4.4.   Little Sleep ..................................................................................................................... 92 
CONCLUSION 
A Poor Choice of Words.............................................................................................................. 93	  
The Term is Pejorative............................................................................................................... 93 
Imām al-Ghazālī’s Means of Knowledge Acquisition as Causally Appropriate within his 
Metaphysic ................................................................................................................................. 95 
Imām al-Ghazālī’s Response....................................................................................................... 95	  
One’s Ignorance of a Phenomenon does not Entail its Non-existence ...................................... 95 






 االلررححييمم٬،  االلححممدد للللهه االلذذيي ففضضّلل ببننيي آآددمم ببااللععللمم ووااللععمملل ععللىى ججممييعع االلععااللمم٬،ببسسمم االلللهه االلررححممنن 
  ووااللصصللااةة ووااللسسللاامم ععللىى ممححممدد سسييدد االلععرربب ووااللععججمم ووععللىى آآللهه ووأأصصححااببهه ييننااببييعع االلععللوومم ووااللححككمم

















“Ask the people of remembrance (the scholars) if you do not know”  
[16:43] 
 
“Say: are those who know and those who do not know equal?”  
[39:9] 
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The chief objective of any reader of nonfiction is to learn. That is, perhaps, what 
brings you here. Reading constitutes one of the primary routes to knowledge open to us 
today. There are, of course, other means, ranging from the pedagogical to the 
technological to the pharmaceutical, but where do we draw the line? Which modes of 
knowledge acquisition are accepted as being efficacious in a given time period or cultural 
milieu? Is, for example, displaying respect for one’s teacher a legitimate means of 
knowledge acquisition? Within the epistemology of Imām Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. 
Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, it is. For Imām al-Ghazālī, the medieval Muslim scholar widely 
known as the “Proof of Islam,” the quest to attain knowledge is not limited to the simple 
mental process of gathering and storing information, but is a metaphysical, ethical project 
tied up in the very fabric of existence and man’s role within it. His view is shared by 
many of the Muslim scholars who preceded and followed him, who constitute the Islamic 
orthodoxy he himself is a proponent of; it is thus, to a large extent, representative of the 
Islamic approach to knowledge acquisition.  
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the means of knowledge acquisition put 
forward in Imām al-Ghazālī’s theory of knowledge, with particular focus on those 
elements that would, today, be deemed prelogical1 in light of modern epistemic 
convictions. I will argue that such means are not prelogical or irrational, as they have 
been described in several places, but are the natural epistemic dimension of an extensive 
and sophisticated metaphysical theology that differs significantly from the metaphysical 
outlook (or lack thereof)2 that motivates such pejorative labeling. I will further argue that 
Imām al-Ghazālī’s inclusion of these means is not a symptom of intellectual weakness or 
ritualistic bias, but a valuable illustration of the wholistic nature of Islamic thought, in 
which the metaphysical, the physical, the epistemological, and the ethical are all treated 
as inextricable facets of existence whose separating boundaries are, in many cases, 
                                                
1 G.E. Von Grunebaum, Introduction to Taʿlīm al-Mutaʿallim: Tarīq al-Taʿallum - Instruction of the Student: 
The Method of Learning, by Al-Zarnūjī, 1-17 (New York: King's Crown Press, 1947), 12.  
2 - in that these labels seem to arise from the scientism and physicalism dominating much of the Western intellectual 
world, particularly the realm of philosophy, with the rise of secularism in educational spheres worldwide. Belief in the 
existence of the metaphysical is often an anathema to those who espouse these worldviews.  
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impossible to delineate. Thus, Imām al-Ghazālī’s conviction that seekers of knowledge 
should conduct their search through metaphysical, spiritual, and ritualistic means does 
not detract from, but rather lends coherence and strength to his theory of knowledge, 
which has become canon within the vast intellectual tradition of his faith.   
The thesis is composed of an introduction and five primary chapters. The 
introduction will offer some biographical information about Imām al-Ghazālī and point to 
the immense role he played within his knowledge tradition. In it, I will also make some 
points of clarification that will be useful for my reader to bear in mind throughout the 
thesis - what I have called ‘disclaimers.’ Chapter One goes on to introduce the concepts 
of knowledge and learning in Islam by relaying the immense significance they carry 
therein. It also points out the normative tone that dominates Imām al-Ghazālī’s 
understanding of knowledge, thus beginning the discussion of the holistic nature of the 
Islamic worldview by drawing a connection between the ethical and the epistemological. 
Chapter Two provides the prerequisite cosmological background necessary to understand 
Imām al-Ghazālī’s epistemological thought. In doing so, it points to the inseparability of 
the metaphysical and epistemological under an Islamic worldview. Chapter Three sets out 
Imām al-Ghazālī’s  theory of knowledge, approaching the question of what knowledge is 
from several angles, using more than one descriptive framework, as Imām al-Ghazālī 
himself does across his various works. Here, we will again see that the Islamic 
metaphysic and ethic pervade his epistemology, and color all his notions related to 
knowledge. Chapter Four turns from the content of Imām al-Ghazālī’s conception of 
knowledge to its sources. I describe these using a tripartite division, distinguishing 
between the primary, secondary, and tertiary sources of knowledge. Empirical knowledge 
appears within this model only as a tertiary source - a crucial point to note when we 
consider the differences between Imām al-Ghazālī’s understanding of knowledge and that 
of those who label the metaphysical elements of his epistemology “prelogical.” Chapter 
Five expands upon the sources of knowledge by listing the means that can be used to 
derive knowledge from them. Here we will find many means of knowledge acquisition 
that are, again, discordant with modern scientism and physicalism, which will give us a 
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sense of the root reason for the mislabeling of the kind Von Grunebaum and others are 
guilty of in secondary sources describing Islamic epistemology. This discussion will 
come to a head in the conclusion, where I bring to bear both Imām al-Ghazālī’s and my 
own arguments to show why the terms “prelogical” or “irrational” cannot be used to 
describe the means of knowledge acquisition that feature in his work and in the larger 
Islamic epistemic he represents. The term “prelogical” is an adjective that means: 
“preceding or prior to the development of logic or logical reasoning; designating ways of 
thought based on myth, magic, etc.”3 It is more specific than the term “illogical,” giving 
the meaning of something (a thought or theory) that precedes the conception of a system 
of logic, likely emerging in an intellectual setting that is devoid of logical thinking. But 
the means of knowledge acquisition included in Imām al-Ghazālī’s epistemological 
thought and, in fact, the entirety of his system of thought, does not precede the 
application of a system of logic - Imām al-Ghazālī was a master of Aristotelian logic.4 
Thus, the designation is inaccurate. One could not even call the means illogical - they do 
not contradict the laws of logic, but the laws of nature, which are, in our time, 
(imprecisely and incorrectly) conflated.  
My goal throughout these chapters will be to show that, given the philosophical 
context in question, the means of knowledge acquisition Imām al-Ghazālī includes within 
his educational thought are not prelogical at all, but are efficacious within their proper 
metaphysic, thus are perfectly consistent. We will see that his worldview blurs the 
boundaries of what should be, to the modern mind, a purely epistemological discourse, 
layering it instead with metaphysical, ethical, and material theories such that each of 
these fields becomes a part of the others to form one overarching philosophy. The result 
is an intricate network of thought: a holistic worldview that does not leave any realm of 
human life or facet of existence unexamined, woven so that its individual threads are 
discernable, but inseparable. Imām al-Ghazālī maintains logical consistency within this 
                                                
3 "Prelogical." In Oxford Living Dictionaries. Accessed March 3, 2017. 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/prelogical. 
4 Frank Griffel, Al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology, (N.p.: Oxford University Press, 2009), 5. 
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worldview in setting out his ideas about how knowledge should be acquired, thus the 
metaphysical elements of his epistemology cannot fairly be said to be “prelogical.”  
Imām al-Ghazālī  
Biographical Background 
As I have said, My focus in this thesis will be on the philosophy of education put 
forward by 12th century scholar Imām Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-
Ghazālī, whose views I will show to be representative of the holistic tendency that 
typifies Islamic thought. Before beginning, it will be useful to provide some biographical 
information about him, tracing, briefly, the intellectual path that molded him into the 
scholar he was. Imām al-Ghazālī was born sometime between the years 1054 and 1057 
C.E. in the town of Ṭābarān in the district of Ṭūs in Khorāsān.5 The biographical 
information derived from Muslim sources6 describes his childhood as a difficult one, 
stating that he and his brother Aḥmad were orphaned at an early age, and that “the boys’ 
father, a simple man with a great love for scholars” left them in the care of a “devout and 
learned Muslim elder to ensure that his sons would receive an education in the religious 
sciences.”7 Financial need “forced them to enter a madrasa for care. Thus, they entered 
into Muslim learning not for the sake of God, as al-Ghazālī is quoted as saying, but for 
the sake of food.”8 In Ṭūs, “beside laying the groundwork for his forthcoming career as a 
jurist through the guidance of a local Shāfiʿite scholar named Aḥmad al-Radhkānī, 
Ghazālī joined the circle of the most eminent exponent of Sufism in Ṭūs, Yūsuf al-
                                                
5 Ibid, 25. 
6 I make this distinction because many modern Western sources on Imām al-Ghazālī will question the accuracy of the 
biographical sources available to us from the Islamic civilization, though I will not be operating under the same 
skepticism in this thesis. Such a discussion is only related to the topic at hand tangentially. 
7 Hamza Yusuf Hanson, "Imam Al-Ghazālī: the Proof of Islam." Foreword. The Book of Knowledge, by Abū Hāmid 
Al-Ghazālī, translated by Kenneth Honerkamp (Louisville: Fons Vitae, 2015), x. 
8 Griffel, Al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology, 25. 
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Nassāj.”9 Thus, Imām al-Ghazālī’s intellectual influences include a spiritual dimension 
beside the more typical juridical dimension from an early age.  
At the age of twenty-two, “he traveled to Nīshāpūr...where he entered the 
Niẓāmiyya College and began studying with Imām al-Ḥaramayn Abū l-Maʿālī l-Juwaynī, 
arguably the greatest theoretical jurist and theologian of his age…[who] had perhaps the 
greatest influence on young al-Ghazālī’s thinking.”10 Under the guiding hand of his 
eminent teacher, al-Ghazālī became, like Imām al-Juwaynī, a proponent of the Shāfiʿī 
school of law and the ’Ashʿarī school of theology.11 Though he was widely considered a 
brilliant student, he was also said to be proud. ʿAbd al-Ghāfir al-Fārisī (d. 1135 C.E.), a 
biographer of al-Ghazālī, said of him: “he had a vain pride and was blinded by the ease 
with which God had provided him to handle words, thoughts, expressions, and the pursuit 
of glory.”12 Still, Imām al-Ghazālī was not without spiritual training at this time, nor was 
Imām al-Juwaynī the only formative figure he encountered in Nishāpūr: he also “attended 
the circle of the important contemporary Sufi Abū ʿAlī al-Farmadhī, a direct disciple of 
the most eminent name of Sufi thought in the early Seljuq period, Abū ’l-Qāsim al-
Qushayrī (d. 465/1072).”13 The link to Imām al-Qushayrī is significant in that it 
represents Imām al-Ghazālī’s spiritual lineage. Just as it was in his adolescence in Ṭūs, 
we find here the dual-influence of the scholarly and Sufi - an education that was both 
intellectual and spiritual.   
Imām al-Ghazālī is said to have continued his studies with Imām al-Juwaynī until 
the latter’s death in 1085, at which point he “ventured on his own as a scholar and soon 
ascended to prominence in the Muslim world of his time.”14 Eventually, he would draw 
the attention of Niẓām al-Mulk, the grand vizier under the Seljuqs for nearly 30 years, 
who was “second in power only to the Seljuq sultans Alp-Arslan (reg. 1063-72) and 
                                                
9 Tobias Mayer, Introduction to Letter to a Disciple, by Abū Hāmid Al-Ghazālī (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society) 
xi.  
10 Yusuf Hanson, "Imam Al-Ghazālī: the Proof of Islam." Foreword. The Book of Knowledge, xi. 
11 Michael E. Marmura, "Translator's Introduction." Introduction. The Incoherence of the Philosophers, by Abū 
Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī, (Provo: Brigham Young University), xvi. 
12 Griffel, Al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology, 26. 
13 Mayer, Introduction to Letter to a Disciple, xvi. 
14 Yusuf Hanson, "Imam Al-Ghazālī: the Proof of Islam." Foreword. The Book of Knowledge, xi. 
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Malikshāh (reg. 1072-92).”15 Imām al-Ghazālī “was given in succession the pre-eminent 
rank of ‘Imām of Khorāsān’ and ‘Imām of Iraq’, and was quickly sent by Niẓām al-Mulk 
to take over as the head of his Niẓāmiyya college in Baghdad.”16 The momentum of 
having been al-Juwaynī’s student fueled his meteoric rise and in his limited time at the 
Niẓāmiyya he quickly entered the upper echelons of Islamic scholarship. His influence 
extended beyond the classroom as well: the sheer “number of books he is thought to have 
written…is staggering.”17 It was during this time that several circumstances, including his 
meteoric rise and role at the college, compounded to cause a “personal crisis which 
engulfed Ghazālī from the beginning of 488/1095,” when “his level of engrossment in 
worldly life began to dawn on him.”18 The competitive academic environment he had 
come to dominate was corrupting; spiritual hypocrisy was rampant amongst his 
colleagues, who, as religious scholars, were responsible for the spiritual well-being not 
just of themselves, but of the community. He observed that “rather than humbly serving 
God by seeking to enlighten and fortify their brothers and sisters…they had become 
enamoured with themselves, setting themselves up as celebrities and authorities in all 
fields, engaging in public debates for their own glory.”19 Nor did he exclude himself from 
this criticism, writing in his autobiography:  
“I reflected on my intention in my public teaching, and I saw that it was not directed purely to 
God, but rather was instigated and motivated by the quest for fame and widespread prestige. 
So I became certain that I was on the brink of a crumbling bank and already on the verge of 
falling into the Fire, unless I set about mending my ways.”20 These worries finally came to a 
head in 1095, when “Ghazali suffered a nervous collapse” which left him unable to speak.”21 
  
This “psychological collapse unfolded over a six month period and was only 
resolved by a total change of direction...he left everything behind…(and) embraced the 
                                                
15 Griffel, Al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology, 27. 
16 Mayer, Introduction to Letter to a Disciple, xvi. 
17 Griffel, Al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology, 35. 
18 Mayer, Introduction to Letter to a Disciple, xviii.  
19 Timothy J. Gianotti, Al-Ghazali's Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 4. 
20 Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī, Al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl wa’l-Mufṣiḥ bi’l-Aḥwāl (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2015), 100. 
For translation, see: Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī, Deliverance from Error: Five Key Texts Including His Spiritual 
Autobiography al-Munqidh min al-Dalāl. Translated by Richard J. McCarthy (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 1999). 
Originally published as Freedom and Fulfillment (n.p.: Twayne, 1980), 79.  
21 R.M. Frank, Al-Ghazali and the Ash'arite School (Durham: Duke University, 1994), 2. 
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anonymous way of life of the dervish.”22 Imām al-Ghazālī secured long-term provisions 
for his family, left his post, and set out on a long, solitary journey, ostensibly to make the 
pilgrimage the Holy Cities. Before this, however, he secretly made his way to Syria, 
“where it is said he intended to become the disciple of the great contemporary Sufi 
master, Naṣr al-Maqdisi.”23 After spending two years in Damascus and a brief time in 
Jerusalem, he “fulfilled the duty of the Greater Pilgrimage in 490/1097, only to be drawn 
back to the caliphal capital by the ‘appeals of his children’. With this his wandering 
ended - though not his seclusion, which he clung to in some form...till 499/1106.”24 For 
nearly 11 years, “he lived the life of asceticism, pursuing the mystic’s way. It was also 
during this period that he composed his magnum opus,” the Iḥyā’.25 He was pressured to 
come out of isolation by Fakhr al-Mulk, the son of Niẓām al-Mulk, who had come to fill 
his father’s position of grand vizier, and was directed to return to the Niẓāmiyya college 
in Nīshāpūr. His stay there, however, was short: “as early as a year later, the great man 
made a final move to his childhood home of Ṭūs where he set about realizing an ambition 
to found a Sufi ‘monastery’ (khānaqāh). Here he would die barely four years later aged 
only fifty-three, leaving behind a contribution whose reverberations continue in Islamic 
thought till now.”26  
A Mission of Revival 
I have provided this extensive biographical information on the subject of our case 
study because his life’s trajectory is a demonstration of “the essential attributes of Imām 
al-Ghazālī’s greatness: his profound authenticity, humility, and introspection, and his 
sincere desire for purity of heart, not just for himself, but for others as well. He undertook 
an arduous journey of self-knowledge, gleaned much from it, and wanted to share the 
fruit of his spiritual labors with others.”27 He was brought up in the dominant educational 
                                                
22 Mayer, Introduction to Letter to a Disciple, xix. 
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid, xxi. 
25 Marmura, "Translator's Introduction." Introduction. The Incoherence of the Philosophers, xviii. 
26 Mayer, Introduction to Letter to a Disciple, xxii. 
27 Yusuf Hanson, "Imam Al-Ghazālī: the Proof of Islam." Foreword. The Book of Knowledge, xxii. 
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system functioning in the Islamic world at that time and during his career as both a 
student and a teacher Imām al-Ghazālī was afforded the opportunity to see its flaws up 
close. He was at the center of the intellectual life of the time and had his finger firmly on 
its pulse, writing avid criticisms of the corrupt, soulless scholarship that had become 
dominant amongst his peers. He developed a “violent contempt - born of personal 
acquaintance - for any spokesman for religion who hypocritically fails to implement its 
real message in his own inner life.”28 Religious knowledge was the key to securing the 
salvation of the entire society, but those whose duty it was to preserve and produce it 
were using it as an avenue to money and political power. His writings on this topic are 
extensive and spread throughout his work, and at times so extreme that there appears to 
be little hope:  
“The guides to the way are the learned who are the heirs of the prophets, but our age is void 
of them, and only the superficial remain, and Satan has mastery over most of them. All of 
them were so engrossed in their worldly fortunes that they came to see good as evil and evil 
as good, so that the science of religion disappeared and the light of guidance was 
extinguished all over the world.”29 
  
But Imām al-Ghazālī, after his spiritual crisis, made it his mission to reform the 
intellectual sphere he dominated by reviving the ethical, spiritual element that he 
considered to be the beating heart of the religion. He writes in the introduction to the 
Iḥyā’, arguably his most important work,  “the knowledge of the next life according to 
which our predecessors walked and which God, in His book, called discernment, wisdom, 
knowledge...has been quite forgotten. This is a calamity in religion and a grave crisis, 
[so] I considered it an important duty for me to compose this book in order to revive the 
religious sciences.”30   
This brings us to a crucial point about Imām al-Ghazālī: he is strategically trying 
to impact change, thus this should be at the forefront of our minds in considering his 
texts: his work should be read as a program for the moral reform of his society through 
                                                
28 Mayer, Introduction to Letter to a Disciple, xxv. 
29 Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm” in Iḥyā’ ʿUlūm al-Dīn (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2011), 8-9. For translation, 
see: 
Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge. Translated by Kenneth Honerkamp (Louisville, Fons Vitae, 2015) 
xli.   
30 Ibid, 9. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, xli. 
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education. In the Iḥyā’, for example, “his principal and almost exclusive concern is with 
the adjudication of religious and moral values...it must not be forgotten that his book on 
knowledge in the Iḥyā’ was intended to serve as an introduction to Muslim religious 
practice and dogma,”31 so that even its extensive chapter devoted entirely to knowledge 
does not put forward an unalloyed epistemology. If we were to generalize Imām al-
Ghazālī’s overall goal, we might say that he sought “to revive Islam at large through its 
mystical dimension. The basic aim was to counter insincerity through systematically 
internalising the religion.”32 True religious knowledge (which, to Imām al-Ghazālī, is the 
highest form of knowledge) had to be lived, and the heart, as the seat of identity within 
Ghazālian psychology, was the organ through which this was accomplished. His project 
of revival thus “synthesized the heart and the head of Islam, accommodating intellect and 
devotion within the same person without dissonance.”33 Though there have been some 
that read this as an exclusively Sufi agenda, Imam al-Ghazālī’s “dedication to the moral 
good of the wider community and the benefit of the common believer is still to the 
fore…[and] while key texts prove Ghazālī’s commitment to the highest arcana and 
doctrines of Sufism, his mysticism is distinctive in ultimately sub-serving the renewal of 
Muslim society in general.”34 If we explore his work, we find the signs of his efforts: he 
often puts forward varying, sometimes competing, philosophical schema to deal with the 
same topic in order to make a point or strategically aim his emphasis and not necessarily 
because that particular framework is the exclusive way of understanding that topic. Take, 
for example, the varying scheme of the levels of existence between the texts Fayṣal al-
Tafriqa bayna’l Islām wa’l-Zandaqa, al-Muṣtaṣfā min ʿilm al-Uṣūl, and Kitāb Sharḥ 
ʿAjā’ib al-Qalb from the Iḥyā. Martin Whittingham notes of these frameworks that “the 
details of a scheme of levels of existence in a given text by al-Ghazālī are not as 
important to him as the underlying point he seeks to make, which differs from text to 
                                                
31 Franz Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 
95. 
32 Mayer, Introduction to Letter to a Disciple, xx. 
33 Yusuf Hanson, "Imam Al-Ghazālī: the Proof of Islam." Foreword. The Book of Knowledge, xxv. 
34 Mayer, Introduction to Letter to a Disciple, xxi. 
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text.”35 To a modern philosophical mind, this is rather perverse: a framework describing 
the levels of existence should be purely ontological, and should plainly set out the 
philosopher’s own, single view. But Imām al-Ghazālī is not, or is not only, a philosopher.  
The reason I have emphasized this is so that we, in examining his work, 
remember not to take his every turn of phrase, nor the hyperbole he often employs for 
urgency, directly at face value: Imām al-Ghazālī’s work must be analyzed in the context 
of his program of revival. He was thoroughly invested in a project of molding minds at 
various levels of society and he writes accordingly. Sometimes the differences in his 
various works arise from differences in the theological threats they were meant to address 
and counter, which, during his time, were many.36 At other times, the differences in 
content arise from the differences in the intellectual states of the audience being aimed at. 
These variations “are not directly contradictory so much as differing in their 
presuppositions and purposes.”37 In Mīzān al-ʿAmal, Imām al-Ghazālī himself describes 
his teachings as being divided into three levels: “transmitted dogmas maintained through 
communal partisanship (taʿaṣṣub) in public contexts such as debates; teachings shared to 
a greater or lesser degree with disciples; and finally doctrines secretly believed to be the 
truth, shared only with others with the same level of understanding.”38 There is a strong 
precedent within Islamic thought to avoid sharing all of knowledge indiscriminately, 
especially with those at beginning stages. The Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص is related to have said, “No one 
speaks to a people on a matter that their intellects cannot grasp without that causing trial 
and tribulation among some of them.”39 One of the important educational principles 
Imām al-Ghazālī advocates is catering one’s teachings to one’s students, as it is 
unacceptable “to delve deeply with the commoners into the complex realities of the 
sciences; rather, one should limit himself to educating them in the [fundamentals] of 
worship, in the duties of the profession they practice, and fill their hearts with longing for 
                                                
35 Martin Whittingham, Al-Ghazālī  and the Qur’ān: One Book, Many Meanings (N.p.: Routledge, 2007), 25. 
36 Mayer, Introduction to Letter to a Disciple, vii-xxvi. 
37 Whittingham, Al-Ghazālī  and the Qur’ān: One Book, Many Meanings, 128. 
38 Mayer, Introduction to Letter to a Disciple, xvi-xvii. 
39 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” 212. Found in the introduction to Muslim’s Ṣaḥīḥ, 1:11. For translation, see: Al-
Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 166. 
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paradise and trepidation of hellfire, as evidenced by the Qur’ānic discourse.”40 This is to 
avoid giving rise to confusion and doubt, “for doubt at times affixes itself to the heart, 
and it becomes difficult to free [the heart] from it, so [the heart] loses hope and 
perishes.”41 Rather than risking the spiritual life of that person, one should be careful to 
provide knowledge as one would medicine: according to the state of the person to whom 
that medicine is being administered, and in acceptable dosages.  
An Indelible Impact 
Imām al-Ghazālī’s program of revival was successful, and it is for this reason he 
is widely considered the mujaddid, or renewer - prophesied to come at the head of every 
century - of the 6th of Islam (A.H.).42 Historically, he was “the undisputed figurehead of 
the revived Sunnism of the Seljuq period,”43 but his work did not merely revive, it also 
synthesized. Imām al-Ghazālī “radically elevated classical Islamic discourse in 
jurisprudence, theology, and spirituality, and firmly embedded Aristotelian logic and 
philosophical ethics into the Islamic tradition.”44 Nor was his impact limited to his own 
time - far from it. The massive influence of his works, their benefit and usefulness to 
Muslim students and scholars, continues through to our time, nearly a millennium after 
his death. In particular, the story of the intellectual upheavals he experienced, as well as 
his “distinctive spirituality, born of crisis as it was, has powerful relevance for the 
modern reader.”45 The mark Imām al-Ghazālī left on the intellectual landscape of Islam 
runs deep; considering the sheer number of people impacted by his work, rather than 
diminishing, this mark has deepened over time. 
I singled out Imām al-Ghazālī’s philosophy of education as the subject matter of 
this thesis over the pedagogical theories of many other scholars because of the modern 
relevancy he carries, the passion with which he views issues of knowledge and learning, 
                                                
40 Ibid, 215. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 168.  
41 Ibid. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 168. 
42 Mayer, Introduction to Letter to a Disciple, vii. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Yusuf Hanson, "Imam Al-Ghazālī: the Proof of Islam." Foreword. The Book of Knowledge, x. 
45 Mayer, Introduction to Letter to a Disciple, xxiv. 
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and the deep self-reflection with which he writes. The fact that Imām al-Ghazālī occupies 
a position of orthodoxy within the Islamic knowledge tradition was also an important 
consideration, as this makes him a suitable candidate to represent it. Within Sunni Islam, 
’Ashʿarī theology is the majority held creedal system, and the Shafiʿī school is one of 
four dominant Sunni legal schools. Al-Ghazālī, as a traditional scholar of Sunni Islam 
and an established teacher of these schools of thought, was part of a recorded chain of 
scholarship reaching back from his teachers to the Prophet Muḥammad himself ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص. 
Moreover, he had a remarkable “ability to strike a balance between retaining 
individuality and independent thought on the one hand, and, on the other, the importance 
of maintaining the community in conformity with an orthodoxy that is, nonetheless, 
rooted in an individually realized knowledge.”46 This gave him the ability to set the tone 
of the orthodoxy he represented, while not making his creative intellect a victim to blind 
imitation.47 Although some have attributed to him some extreme intentions with regards 
to philosophy or Sufism, “his Sufism…[was] both derivative and normative. The Iḥyā’ is 
mainly a reiteration and summation of the works of scholars who preceded him, such as 
al-Junayd (d. 298/910), al-Qushayrī (d. 465/1072)...Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī (d. 386/998), and 
others.”48 As for accusations regarding the Ancient Greek philosophical thought that 
echoes in his works, Imām al-Ghazālī offers his own defense: “As a matter of fact, some 
of them were my own original ideas - and it is not farfetched that ideas should coincide, 
just as a horse’s hoof may fall on the print left by another; and some are found in the 
scriptures; and the sense of most is found in the writings of the Sufis.”49 He goes on to 
argue, essentially, that a true word is a true word, no matter who utters it. In line with the 
saying of the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, Imām al-Ghazālī considers “wisdom [to be] the lost object of 
                                                
46 Yusuf Hanson, "Imam Al-Ghazālī: the Proof of Islam." Foreword. The Book of Knowledge, xxiii. 
47 Walter James Skellie, "Translator's Introduction." Introduction to The Marvels of the Heart, by Abū Ḥāmid Al-
Ghazālī (Louisville, USA: Fons Vitae, 2010), xi. 
48 Ibid, xviii. 
49 Al-Ghazālī, Al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl wa’l-Mufṣiḥ bi’l-Aḥwāl, 80. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, Deliverance 
from Error, 69. 
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the believer; he seizes it whenever he has the opportunity.”50 Many who have studied his 
works believe that his propensity to integrate what he deemed to be  acceptable from the 
philosophical traditions outside of Islam was a positive change. Others have claimed that 
his repudiation of certain philosophical ideas or tendencies ended the age of generative 
Islamic philosophy. Though the nature of his impact can be disputed, that is not our 
concern here; what is significant for the purposes of this thesis is the immensity of 
impact, which is indisputable.51 For these reasons and others, Imām al-Ghazālī is an 
excellent case study in the quest to understand the Islamic approach to education.  
Disclaimers  
Representation is Relative 
After having emphasized to such an extreme degree the representative nature of 
the material before us, it will add a degree of balance to the argument when I remind my 
reader that there is a limit to how representative a thinker from within a religion is of that 
entire tradition, even when pulled from an orthodoxy. Imām al-Ghazālī is an excellent 
representation of the Islamic knowledge tradition, but representation is a relative matter. 
Without delving too deeply into a postmodern mentality of skepticism about identity, let 
me simply state that we are studying the example of a single scholar from a specific time 
within the history of the Islamic Civilization, whom some from within his tradition, both 
during his time and after, have criticized and even rejected.52 Thus, we ought to take 
Imām al-Ghazālī’s theories as an example of Islamic thought without considering them to 
be exhaustively representative of it.  
Caution around Linguistic and Terminological Usages  
An important thing to consider in approaching Imām al-Ghazālī’s works in 
English, as we are, is that the ability of translations to accurately portray the meaning 
intended by the author is limited. One of our translators, Kenneth Honerkamp, quotes the 
                                                
50 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” 188. Paraphrased from a ḥadīth found in al-Tirmidhī, 2687. For translation, see: Al-
Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 144.  
51 Yusuf Hanson, "Imam Al-Ghazālī: the Proof of Islam." Foreword. The Book of Knowledge, xi.  
52 Griffel, Al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology, 54. 
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phrase “traductor traittore” (translators are traitors) in his preface to The Book of 
Knowledge to serve as a reminder of this fact to himself and to his readers.53 The true, 
intended meaning of a text, particularly scriptural texts, is crucial in all of Islamic 
thought,54 but it is particularly important in the context of transmitting knowledge. Imām 
al-Ghazālī expresses a worry about confusion occurring even within the Arabic language 
due to the misuse of terms: “when terms are distorted from their requisite outward 
meanings without the safeguarding of the tradition that has been transmitted from the 
master of the law [the Prophet Muḥammad] ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, and without even a minute rational proof 
to justify it, then people can no longer rely on or trust these terms.”55 His worry is not 
unfounded, as terms are bound to change with time; the development of the Islamic 
sciences certainly bears this out. The term fiqh provides a pertinent example: Imām al-
Ghazālī discusses the varying meanings of this term in several places throughout his 
works. It is central to any understanding of Islamic epistemology, yet remains extremely 
unclear, with several meanings hovering in the background every time it is used, and 
more so when it is used without some indication or specification of the intended 
meaning.56 From this we ought to derive a kind of caution about terminological usage in 
the epistemological discourse we are about to enter into. The limitations of language in 
transmitting knowledge is a valuable things to keep in mind throughout our discussion. It 
leads us to the conclusion that learning cannot simply be an act of the limited human 
intellect, nor can it be conducted simply through the limited means of language: coming 
to know - the act of knowing - involves more subtle faculties. Imām al-Ghazālī holds that 
that faculty lies in the heart and that it is ultimately within God’s power to place 
knowledge therein.  
                                                
53 Kenneth Honerkamp, "Translator’s Preface." Preface. The Book of Knowledge, by Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī 
(Louisville: Fons Vitae) xx. 
54 Because is not relativistic about truth and holds a correspondence theory of reality. The first lines of the famous 
creedal text, the ʿAqīdah al-Nasafiyyah, are: “The people of reality say that the real essences of things exist in reality 
and that the knowledge of them is verifiable as real in contradiction to the Sophists.” See: Saʿd al-Dīn Al-Taftazānī, 
Sharḥ al-ʿAqā’id al-Nasafiyya (Istanbul: Fazilet Neşriyat, 2015) 56-8. For translation, see: Saʿd al-Dīn Al-Taftazānī, 
A Commentary on the Creed of Islam: Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftazānī on the Creed of Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī. 
Translated by Earl Edgar Elder (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), 5. 
55 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” 138. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 101.  
56 Ibid, 23, 120. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 5-6, 87. 
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Imām al-Ghazālī’s Writings are Motivated by his Agenda of Revival  
Setting asides obfuscation arising from issues in translation or shifting 
terminological sands, there is the larger issue of Imām al-Ghazālī’s rhetoric, which 
requires a degree of familiarity to navigate. I will provide two further disclaimers on this 
front. The first is that, as we have seen previously, Imām al-Ghazālī has a normative 
agenda and will not put forward his innermost philosophical conviction if he feels it to be 
contextually inappropriate. The knowledge he is focused on, the center of his 
epistemological thought, is religious knowledge. Even though we are going to be 
discussing a topic my reader may believe ought to be purely epistemological, this is 
simply not how knowledge is addressed in Imām al-Ghazālī’s works. Nor is he unaware 
of this; it has simply become his conviction, after years of study, that the highest form of 
knowledge is knowledge of God. He comments on the efforts of those who take other 
than religious knowledge as their focal point in the following way:  
“If you were cognizant of the degrees into which knowledge is categorized, and you knew the 
[true] value of the knowledge of the abode of the hereafter, it would be clear to you that the 
knowledge that they have occupied themselves with is of little value with regard to [true] 
knowledge; its true value is what is applied in actions accomplished for God alone, when it is 
undertaken with the intention of drawing close to God”57 
  
This is not to say that Imām al-Ghazālī did not operate on the basis of a thoroughly 
elaborated epistemology - there are places in which the normative element of his theory 
of knowledge takes a backseat to the epistemological element, such as in the explanations 
of thought found in his Muṣtaṣfā or Qiṣtāṣ. It is simply that he does not always set it out 
for the reader as such. Recall that Imām al-Ghazālī employs multiple ways of 
approaching the same issue across his various works in order to achieve specific impacts 
in varying discussions. All of this might confuse the reader of his works, or the reader of 
a humble treatise like this one, covering some portion of his thought, so it will be useful 
to bear it in mind going forward.    
                                                
57 Ibid, 186. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 142-3. 
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“Is” Statements that are not Ontological 
The second warning about Imām al-Ghazālī’s rhetoric is related to a linguistic 
usage that does not translate from Arabic into English: the seemingly casual use of 
ontological statements of the form ‘knowledge is such-and-such,’ where a definition is 
not what is intended. In English, “is” statements of this kind provide either a  definition 
or a description and can mean one of two things: knowledge is, at its essence, such-and-
such, or, a quality of knowledge is such-and-such. But this format seems to carry a wider 
meaning in its Arabic usage. There are many instances, occurring both in Imām al-
Ghazālī’s own expressions and in the texts he provides as evidence, where a concept is 
associated directly with a word in what appears to be a blatant ontological attribution 
(knowledge is light, knowledge is reverence), but when examined closely in context, the 
exact nature of that attribution becomes fuzzy. How is knowledge both light and 
reverence? Is reverence a descriptor of knowledge? Are these statements both expressing 
separate epistemological principles? Do they conflict? These questions arise and hang in 
the air precisely because Imām al-Ghazālī employs this sentence structure not necessarily 
to set out a one-to-one relation between the subject and the noun now associated with it, 
but to connect two concepts in a wider variety of potential relations. For example, in 
Arabic, the fruit or result of a thing can be related to it by using this sentence structure, so 
one should not understand from the sentence ‘knowledge is such-and-such’ that 
knowledge is in essence such-and-such or that knowledge is, amongst other things, such-
and-such, but that a product of knowledge is such-and-such. My evidence for this will be 
less than direct, because Imām al-Ghazālī takes for granted that we will be able to 
understand his usages and does not clarify them; we can fairly assume that the audience 
of the Iḥyā’ would have been students and teachers of the Islamic sciences and thus 
would have a thorough grasp of rhetoric on top of their native level fluency in both the 
Arabic language and in Islamic thought in general. But for the modern reader, there are 
points where the layers of meaning intended by such statements, immediately visible to 
Imām al-Ghazālī’s contemporary audience, are sifted and become visible to our weaker 
sight:  
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“It seems that the linguistic origin of the term [intellect] applies to that innate inclination [the 
capacity of the intellect], and likewise its actual function. It was only applied to the sciences 
[the object of that function] in that it is its fruit, in the same manner a thing is known by its 
fruit. It is said, ‘Knowledge is ‘reverence’ [in the heart]; and the scholar is the one who 
reveres God.’ For reverence is the fruit of knowledge, thus it [the term intellect] applies 
figuratively to meanings other than innate inclination.”58 
  
Here Imām al-Ghazālī is engaged in a linguistic discussion of the designations of the term 
“intellect,” or ʿaql, but our interest in the quote is that it serves to show the multiplicity of 
meanings attributed to this single term. First, ʿaql refers to the capacity of the intellect (an 
essential definition of the term), then ʿaql it refers to the function of that capacity (a 
quality of the thing described), then ʿaql refers to the sciences, which are its fruit, because 
“a thing is known by its fruit.” It is the latter usage, which Imām al-Ghazālī here 
describes as figurative, that I am interested in stressing, because it is unusual to English 
speakers. The point is also of general interest to us because the multiplicity of meanings 
expressed in these types of blatant statements is a linguistic byproduct of a worldview 
whose concern is never merely ontological, but reaches beyond this to the results and 
interrelations of things.  
Moreover, Imām al-Ghazālī himself devalues reliance on ontological statements 
and terminological frameworks in order to understand a concept. He is a proponent of 
experiential knowledge, as we will see in Chapter Three, and as such, believes with deep 
conviction in types of learning that bypass the mental capacities entirely. In the following 
quote, he seems to express this, discouraging excessive reliance on philosophical 
statements or terms to arrive at the full understanding of a “reality,” particularly within 
the field of epistemology: “the great majority of these confused statements [on 
epistemology] have arisen from the ignorance of certain groups of people who sought to 
know realities through words and terms, whereupon they wandered about as a result of 
the confusion that constitutes the technical terminologies of the people, terminologies that 
are but derived from words and terms themselves.”59 What this amounts to is, again, that 
we ought to be careful taking Imām al-Ghazālī’s every word as an expression of his 
                                                
58 Ibid, 316-7. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 257. 
59 Ibid, 327. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 266. 
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philosophical convictions. A reader of Imām al-Ghazālī ought to maintain the same 
flexibility in understanding the expression of his ontology as he displays in expressing it. 
Otherwise, it will seem to us that Imām al-Ghazālī lacks precision in his thought, or that 
he holds many varying views about what knowledge is, and we will struggle to 
distinguish between or situate these ideas. Simply put, when Imām al-Ghazālī writes that 
‘knowledge is light,’ we should not understand from this that knowledge is exclusively or 
merely that, and the same holds for the many examples of this kind of statement one 
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF KNOWLEDGE IN ISLAM 
 
Knowledge and its pursuit are central to the Islamic faith. It is related that the 
Prophet Muḥammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said, “Whoever travels a path seeking knowledge; God will 
[guide him] to travel a path that leads to heaven.”60 Imām al-Ghazālī also relates the 
following from him: “Any aspect of knowledge a man studies is better for him than the 
world and all it contains.”61 In the Arabic, there are several key terms that can be 
translated as knowledge across different epistemic frameworks, however, ʿilm is the one 
used in these ḥadīth, or prophetic traditions, and may be the most clear and easily 
accessible in the context of this thesis. ʿIlm, then, represents a fundamental pillar of 
Islam’s history, its social mores, its ritual and legal practice, its body of ethics, its 
spiritual teachings, and, of course, its intellectual tradition. As Franz Rosenthal puts it, 
“ʿilm is one of those concepts that have dominated Islam and given Muslim civilization 
its distinctive shape and complexion. In fact, there is no other concept that has been 
operative as a determinant of Muslim civilization in all its aspects to the same extent as 
ʿilm.”62 It cannot be overstated: knowledge pervades every aspect of Islam, even 
determines and upholds it, since it is by knowledge that the content of religion is known 
and acted upon. 
                                                
60 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” 34. Found in Muslim, 2699. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of 
Knowledge, 14.  
61 Ibid, 35. Found in Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Jāmiʿ bayān al-ʿilm wa-faḍlih, 255. Alternatively cited as a saying of Ḥasan 
al-Baṣrī. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 14. 
62 Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam, 2.  
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1.1.   The Normative Nature of Knowledge and Learning  
1.1.1.   In Islam, all Acts are Normative 
In order to understand the significance of knowledge, it is important to keep in 
mind that within the Islamic worldview, every act a human being undertakes is normative 
and that knowledge and learning are no exception. In Islam, God’s divine care and 
mastery encompasses all of existence, thus His Law guides every stage of human life and 
regulates all facets of human interaction in and with the world; in seeking salvation, 
every action has significance, and all of human activity is subject to divine judgment.63 
Taking this metaphysic to be true, every aspect of human existence on earth has an 
inherent moral quality that is embodied in a ruling derived from religious law, falling on 
a spectrum from forbidden to obligatory, with neutral as the midpoint between the two. 
The Islamic metaphysic gives rise to its ethic, and that ethic is a sign pointing back to the 
metaphysic, thus the two layers of thought or existence are, within that worldview, 
inseparable. The effect of this is to bring all of reality under the purview of religion - that 
is to say, under God’s dominion - and is why, for Muslims, a normative tinge colors 
every realm of philosophy and every element of human life. Imām al-Ghazālī’s 
admonition to his student in the short treatise Letter to a Disciple that “all that you say 
and do, or do not do, should be following the paradigm of the Law,”64 reflects this 
outlook.  
1.1.2.   Knowledge and Learning are Normative Because they are a Means to Proper 
Conduct in all Other Acts 
Knowledge and learning are normative in that it is the means to understanding the 
law, and thus to proper worship. The pervasiveness of law and its wholesale applicability 
to all action and belief clearly demonstrate the significance of the Islamic sciences (those 
                                                
63 Von Grunebaum, Introduction to Taʿlīm al-Mutaʿallim: Tarīq al-Taʿallum - Instruction of the Student: The 
Method of Learning, 13.  
64 Abū Hāmid Al-Ghazālī, Ayyuhā’l-Walad (Istanbul: Dār al-Shafaqah, 2015), 94. For translation, see: Abū Hāmid 
Al-Ghazālī, Letter to a Disciple. Translated by Tobias Mayer. (Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts Society, 2005), 22.  
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disciplines or bodies of knowledge that developed historically within the tradition) of law 
and jurisprudence. In order to attain that knowledge, one must possess a suite of auxiliary 
sciences, such as grammar, logic, and rhetoric, as well as supplementary sciences, such as 
hermeneutics.65 Before one even comes to the content of religious law, one must first 
establish one’s belief by learning creedal matters, which are expanded upon within the 
wider field of theology.66 Seeking a base minimum of knowledge about “creed, acts, and 
[acts] to abstain from”67 is incumbent upon every Muslim as an individual obligation; this 
is the knowledge about which the Prophet Muḥammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said “seeking knowledge is an 
obligation on every Muslim.”68 Imām al-Ghazālī adds to this the knowledge of the 
internal, spiritual states underlying outward acts,69 whose dissemination is a primary goal 
of his magnum opus, the Iḥyā’ ʿUlūm al-Dīn, or Revival of the Religious Sciences.70 
Seeking knowledge beyond that is incumbent upon the larger society as a communal 
obligation.71 As an act undertaken by the morally responsible agent (humankind), seeking 
knowledge has its own rulings - it is an individual or communal obligation, or, depending 
on the discipline in question, may take other rulings - but is also the means by which the 
rulings of all other acts are determined and understood. It is thus the key to a fruitful 
religious life:  
“through it God is obeyed, by it He is worshipped, by it His unity is affirmed, by it He is 
lauded, and by it He is approached with piety. By it family ties are maintained, and by it the 
lawful and unlawful are known. Knowledge is the leader, and deeds his followers.”72  
 
The obligatory nature of knowledge and its resultant moral weight moves it far beyond 
purely epistemic boundaries into the normative and ethical.  
                                                
65 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” 65. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 40-1. 
66 Ibid, 61. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 36-7. 
67 Ibid, 57. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 32. 
68 Ibid, 35. Found in Ibn Māja, 224. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 15. 
69 Ibid, 80. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 53. 
70 Mayer, Introduction to Letter to a Disciple, xx. 
71 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” 146. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 107. 
72 Ibid, 46. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 23. 
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1.1.3.   The Act of Seeking Knowledge as Worship 
The normative weight and general significance of knowledge is further 
emphasized when we note that seeking knowledge is not simply a means to proper 
worship,73 it is itself an act of worship in Islam. Imām al-Ghazālī writes: “seeking 
knowledge is the worship of the heart, the prayer of the innermost mystery (ṣalāt-as-sirr), 
and inward intimacy with God.”74 Just how it is an act of worship is a subtlety that is 
difficult to grasp, which the Companions of the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص themselves grappled with, as 
the following ḥadīth implies:  
“When it was said to him, ‘O Messenger of God! Which are the most worthy of acts?’ he 
responded, ‘The knowledge of God.’ Whereupon it was said, ‘We are asking about acts [of 
devotion].’ So he ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص responded, “Knowledge of God.’ Whereupon it was said, ‘We are 
asking about acts [of devotion] and you reply with knowledge.’ So he ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said, ‘Verily a 
minimum of acts [of devotion] will be of benefit if accompanied by knowledge; whereas 
great quantities of acts [of devotion] will be of no benefit if accompanied by ignorance.’”75    
 
Knowledge is in many places compared to ritual practice by the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, as well as the 
scholars who are, by his own statement, his proper inheritors.76 It is, moreover, described 
as being superior to various weighty supererogatory acts.77 The seeker of knowledge is a 
worshipper par excellence: if his intention is as it should be, his intellectual work is God-
directed no matter what its content. If knowledge is in and of itself worship, it is virtuous 
in and of itself. Imām al-Ghazālī explains that the virtue of knowledge relative to other 
qualities is obvious, but clarifies that virtue is also an essential quality of knowledge: 
“knowledge is virtue in itself and in an absolute sense without attribution.”78  
                                                
73 Ibid, 25-7. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 7-9. 
74 Ibid, 181. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 138. 
75 Ibid, 27. Found in Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Jāmiʿ bayān al-ʿilm wa-faḍlih, 214. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The 
Book of Knowledge, 9. 
76 Ibid, 22. Found in Ibn Māja, 224; al-Tirmidhī, 2682. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 5. 
77 Ibid, 37, 130-1. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 16, 95-6. 
78 Ibid, 47. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 24. 
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1.1.4.   The Act of Seeking Knowledge as an Ethical Pursuit 
If Imām al-Ghazālī’s motives in writing about education were primarily ethical 
and the way he describes knowledge is constantly colored by a normative tinge, this is an 
indication of that fact that, in Islamic thought, the act of seeking out knowledge is an 
ethical project.79 Thus, Imām al-Ghazālī’s epistemological ideas, even in works wholly 
reserved for the subject, such as The Book of Knowledge, are all expressed “in a semantic 
field defined by an ethical perspective.”80 The most basic knowledge that one will gain 
about the world is to recognize that it is imperfect, passing, and ephemeral; someone who 
fails to see this “lacks even minimal insight.”81 Knowledge of the paltriness of the world 
forces the person possessed of perception to seek out other than it: the hereafter. 
Knowledge of their contrast drives one to spend one’s worldly life in order to gain the 
best in the next life, and further knowledge provides one with the tools to do so. Seeking 
knowledge thus becomes the means of traversing the ethical path through this life and, as 
such, is practically the equivalent of ritual worship. A strong proof of this is the very 
telling ḥadīth transmitted through Abū Dharr, that the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said:  
“Attending a gathering in which there is knowledgeable discourse is superior to praying one 
thousand cycles [of prayer], or visiting one thousand sick [people], or attending one thousand 
funerals.’ It was then put to him, ‘O Messenger of God! Even [better than] the recitation of 
the Qur’ān?’ To which he ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص responded, ‘Does the recitation of the Qur’ān render any benefit 
without knowledge?”82  
 
There are countless other narrations from the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص and his companions, as well as 
the great scholars of the past comparing learning and the pursuit of knowledge to whole 
nights spent in devotion, jihād, and other supererogatory acts.83  
Another bond tying the ethical and the epistemological together is that, in Islam, 
an ethical life sanctifies and legitimizes the knowledge possessed by a person. As stated 
                                                
79 Honerkamp, "Translator’s Preface," xxix. 
80 Ibid, xxx. 
81 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” 223. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 175. 
82 Ibid, 35-6. Found in Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī, Qūt al-Qulūb, 1:67. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of 
Knowledge, 15. 
83 Ibid, 31, 38, 36-7 (respectively). Examples can be found in Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Jāmiʿ bayān al-ʿilm wa-faḍlih, 108, 
142-44, 159. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 12, 17, 16 (respectively). 
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above, knowledge drives one forward on the path of life, which is delineated by ethical 
boundaries. When knowledge fails to do this for a person, and when religious knowledge 
in particular is not acted upon, an apparent contradiction arises that confuses others. For 
this reason, knowledge that does not give rise to action is described as madness.84 An 
unethical life taints the heart and obscures the knowledge therein, dimming its light until 
one is left in darkness.85 Scholars, in particular, who do not lead ethical lives cause others 
to be distanced from knowledge and the religion; despite Imām al-Ghazālī’s injunction 
that one should take truth wherever one finds it, the people are naturally repulsed by 
those who do not practice what they preach, and are at risk of rejecting whatever they 
say.86 Furthermore, the masses see the scholars as being best of them - their leaders - and  
take the knowledgeable as models to follow; when the scholar is morally corrupt, the 
people tend to follow him or her in what he or she does, and his or her “admonition...rolls 
off the hearts like raindrops off a smooth stone.”87 If one lives an ethical life and works to 
build one’s character, however, one’s knowledge is legitimized, validated, and beautified; 
for this reason, “Ḥasan [al-Baṣrī] used to say, ‘Clemency is the minister of knowledge, 
affability its father, and humility its raiment.’”88 
1.1.5.   The Significance of Epistemology  
In emphasizing the normative nature of knowledge, we should not unwittingly 
ignore the depth and pervasiveness of epistemology in Islam. Even if we were to leave 
aside its normative component, knowledge as a purely epistemic category would still 
have to be attained by every human in order for them to formulate their worldview, since 
knowledge and epistemology have primacy in the realm of philosophy. The scholars of 
Islam throughout history maintained this view and, as a result, a practice developed 
amongst them of beginning comprehensive texts with a chapter on knowledge. This 
custom, “which, it seems, had its most conspicuous beginning in the Ṣaḥīḥ of al-Bukhārī, 
                                                
84 Al-Ghazālī, Ayyuhā’l-Walad, 90. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, Letter to a Disciple, 16.  
85 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” 225. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 177. 
86 Ibid, 216. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 169. 
87 Ibid, 235. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 185. 
88 Ibid, 280. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 225. 
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reached its high point with al-Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111) and the ‘Book of Knowledge,’” 
introducing his Iḥyā’.”89 The reason for its emergence was that, within the Islamic 
knowledge tradition, “logic and, above all, speculative theology had established once and 
for all that epistemology was the basis of scholarly activity and had to be discussed 
first.”90 In describing his own quest for knowledge, Imām al-Ghazālī writes of the 
precedence he necessarily gave epistemology: “I began by saying to myself: ‘What I seek 
is knowledge of the true meaning of things. Of necessity, therefore, I must inquire into 
just what the true meaning of knowledge is.’”91 The form this inquiry took defined Imām 
al-Ghazālī and molded his life’s work. Like many seekers before and after him, his quest 
for knowledge allowed him to formulate his entire worldview; it is therefore impossible 
that his theory of knowledge could be limited to the epistemological alone. In considering 
Imām al-Ghazālī’s vast body of work, one must understand that knowledge was a 
cornerstone of his understanding of reality, and the educational mission he takes up as a 
result colors every aspect of his writings.  
1.2.   Knowledge as Both Means and End 
1.2.1.   Imām al-Ghazālī’s System of Valuation 
With this normatively-tinged ontological statement, we arrive at Imām al-
Ghazālī’s dual valuation of knowledge: knowledge as a means and knowledge as an end. 
He explains to his reader that  
“a valuable object that is sought after can be classified as either that which is sought for other 
than itself, or that which is sought for itself, or that which is sought for other than itself and 
for itself as well. That which is sought for itself alone is of higher value and superior to that 
which is sought for other than itself.”92  
 
Knowledge is something that is sought for its own value, in and of itself, as well as “a 
means to the abode of the hereafter and its delights as well as a path to proximity with 
                                                
89 Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam, 94. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Al-Ghazālī, Al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl wa’l-Mufṣiḥ bi’l-Aḥwāl, 49. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, Deliverance 
from Error, 55.  
92 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” 47. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 24. 
 االلررححييمم٬،  االلححممدد للللهه االلذذيي ففضضّلل ببننيي آآددمم ببااللععللمم ووااللععمملل ععللىى ججممييعع االلععااللمم٬،ببسسمم االلللهه االلررححممنن 
  ووااللصصللااةة ووااللسسللاامم ععللىى ممححممدد سسييدد االلععرربب ووااللععججمم ووععللىى آآللهه ووأأصصححااببهه ييننااببييعع االلععللوومم ووااللححككمم




God, for there is no means of approaching Him but through it [knowledge].”93 Imām al-
Ghazālī refers to the former as the “the science of [spiritual] unveiling” and the latter the 
“science of [proper] conduct.”94 The kind of knowledge that is an end in and of itself is, 
in this world, the knowledge of God, which is in a sense a precursor to the highest 
blessing of paradise - being in the presence of God - and it is only after death that 
complete and perfect knowledge of this type, or of any type, is attained.95 Reaching 
paradise becomes the most important goal of human life, with the underlying goal of 
closeness to God there, as well as before that in the world:  
“The most exalted rank with regard to humanity is eternal bliss [in the hereafter]...one will 
only attain the incumbent actions through the knowledge of how to complete them. The 
foundation of bliss in this world and the next is therefore knowledge; it is thus the most 
excellent deed of all.”96 
 
As an agent with free will, one may choose not to pursue knowledge at all, or to pursue it 
for the wrong reasons, but this is done at the risk of otherworldly punishment: “Whoever 
does not turn toward the goal, or respond to it; or who responds for his own self-interest, 
with no intention of exemplary conduct or servanthood, rather for personal gain in this 
world, is among the companions of the left hand and those lost on the path, [and] for him, 
boiling water will be the welcome and burning in fire.”97 Salvation is thus intimately tied 
to learning. Knowledge - the knowledge that Imām al-Ghazālī is interested in and makes 
the subject of his educational philosophy, whether we consider its function as a means or 
take it to be an end in of itself, all centers on proximity to God and is thus not limited to 
the purely epistemic, but is fundamentally normative, not to mention its deep 
metaphysical implications.  
                                                
93 Ibid, 48-9. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 24-5. 
94 Ibid, 14. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, xlv. 
95 Ibid, 194. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 150. 
96 Ibid, 48. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 25. 
97 Ibid, 200. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 155. 
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1.3.   Why We Ought to Examine Educational Philosophy in Islam 
Naturally, if knowledge is central, education, as the means to it, is equally so. 
Imām al-Ghazālī takes this to be self-evident, “for if knowledge is the best of 
undertakings, then acquiring it is a quest for that which is most excellent, and teaching it 
is a means to attaining [what is] most excellent.”98 There is no human project with more 
precedence, nothing one can pursue that is superior to knowledge; the Companion of the 
Prophet Abū l-Dardā cautions that one “be either a scholar, or a student, or one who 
listens; do not be a fourth [i.e., none of these], lest you perish.”99  
1.3.1.  Islamic Theories of Knowledge and Education Remain Largely Ignored in Modern 
Academia 
With this evidence before us, we see clearly that knowledge and education play a 
truly crucial role in shaping and perpetuating the Islamic worldview. It goes without 
saying, then, that their study would be central to the field of Islamic studies. As Avner 
Giladi points out in his article on Islamic Educational theories, “the status of education, 
its goals and contents, its organizational patterns, its methods, and the thinking about 
educational problems all reflect basic characteristics of the culture being studied...so that 
its importance far exceeds the confines of the history of education.”100 Yet, “Studies of 
this kind...have not been carried out in the context of Islamic culture…[and] aspects of 
the history of Islamic education, such as educational theories, have not been dealt with 
thoroughly.”101 While much has been written on the emergence and content of the Islamic 
sciences, surprisingly little secondary material has been written on the Islamic conception 
of knowledge and learning, and the role that conception plays within the religion.  This 
neglect is not due to a lack of interest in the connection between education and the 
development of religious societies, but is specific to the study of Islam, as evinced by the 
                                                
98 Ibid, 49. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 25. 
99 Ibid, 37. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 16. 
100 Avner Giladi, "Islamic Educational Theories in the Middle Ages: Some Methodological Notes with Special 
Reference to al-Ghazali." Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies) 14, no. 1 (1987), 3. 
101 Ibid.  
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fact that “not a single important monograph on the educational philosophy of any Muslim 
thinker has been published in the West of the kind devoted, for instance, to the theories of 
Plato, of St. Augustine, or of Rabbi Judah Loew of Prague, the Maharal.”102 For those 
seeking to understand Islamic epistemology and pedagogy, the primary sources are many, 
spanning various disciplines, but the secondary sources analyzing them are few, as are 
translations of those primary sources into languages more accessible to non-Arabic 
speakers. The deplorable lack in the material available on Islamic education in Western 
languages represents a fundamental weak point in the study of its civilization. This thesis 
is a modest attempt to begin to fill that gap.  
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CHAPTER TWO:  
COSMOLOGICAL CONTEXT 
2.1.   The Intertwined Corporeal and Spiritual Realms 
Imām al-Ghazālī’s theory of knowledge is tied intimately with his cosmology; in 
order to understand the former, we must briefly touch on the latter. The most basic 
element of Imām al-Ghazālī’s conception of the universe is that he sees the world - all 
that God has created - as existing on the planes of the physical and metaphysical: “Know 
that the cosmos is two worlds: spiritual and corporeal (rūḥānī wa jismānī).”103 These 
realms are also referred to as the ʿālam al-malakūt (the world of the dominion, or the 
spiritual world) and the ʿālam al-mulk (the visible or corporeal world), respectively. 
Though they are distinct, they are not separate spheres, but rather are connected; they are 
layered upon or permeate one another such that it is possible to access one from the other. 
In the context of earthly life, man’s senses dominate his untrained consciousness, thus he 
will experience this as movement from the physical world to the metaphysical one: “The 
visible world is a ladder to the world of dominion...if there were no relationship and 
connection between the two worlds, climbing from one world to the other would be 
inconceivable. Hence, the divine mercy made the visible world parallel to the world of 
dominion.”104  
2.1.1.   Movement Between the Corporeal and Spiritual Realms Constitutes the Path of 
Religious Life 
Imām al-Ghazālī adds a normative element to this purely ontological discourse 
by equating the movement between the visible world and the world of the dominion with 
travel on the straight path.105 “The straight path” is the phrase used in Islam to describe 
                                                
103 Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī, The Niche of Lights: A Parallel English-Arabic Text. Translated by David Buchman 
(N.p.: Brigham Young University Press, 1998), 25.  
104 Ibid, 27.  
105 Ibid.  
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the moral path through earthly life that is the means to earning paradise and avoiding the 
hellfire in the next life. By equating this path with the gradual raising of the human 
consciousness beyond the senses to the spiritual, Imām al-Ghazālī equates the ontological 
and ethical imperatives that drive man in his earthly existence. From the beginning of his 
existence, man is in need of his Creator from an ontological perspective (that is, in order 
to exist). The normative association Imām al-Ghazālī makes brings to light a second need 
- need from a moral perspective - since man is incapable of progressing on the path he 
must walk without the guidance of his Creator. If he wishes to make the journey from the 
purely physical to the spiritual realm, he needs to be aware of and understand both. This 
is where the “divine mercy” Imām al-Ghazālī mentions above comes in: God created the 
physical world parallel to and a sign of the metaphysical world as a mercy, so that we 
might reach one from the other.106 According to Imām al-Ghazālī, this mercy is 
expansive, as no part of the physical world is excluded from symbolic relationship: “there 
is nothing in this world that is not a similitude (mīthāl) of something in the world of 
dominion.”107 God uses the means of both the physical and the metaphysical realms to 
guide man, to provide him with knowledge so that he may safely make the journey to the 
hereafter. Thus God’s guidance of mankind is not limited to the scriptures He sends to 
His messengers, nor the prophets He raises from amongst their ranks to guide them - 
besides the books of revelation there is also the book of creation, by which God also 
teaches and guides man. In this way, God is always the primary cause of whatever 
knowledge reaches man, and the other means discussed are His tools, and are always 
secondary.  
2.2.   The Heart as the Seat of Knowledge 
So how does man come to know, and where does this capacity exist in him? The 
answer to the second question is straightforward: in Islamic psychology, the heart is the 
seat of knowledge. Imām al-Ghazālī elaborates on this somewhat: “know well that the 
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entity that is striving toward God to realize proximity is the heart, not the physical body; 
nor do I intend by the heart that perceivable flesh [in the chest], rather it is a hidden 
mystery of God’s intimate secrets, that is not apprehended by the senses, and a subtle 
entity of His subtleties...in the terminology of the law, it is referred to as the heart.”108 
This subtle, immaterial reality that houses our innermost being can also be called the 
spirit or the soul, but very little can be said about it ontologically beyond what we see 
here. This is because God declares the precise nature of the soul to be beyond human 
comprehension in the Qur’ān, and Imām al-Ghazālī adheres to the common practice of 
Muslim scholars by maintaining a public silence on the topic.109 We have mentioned the 
two layers of existence which man simultaneously inhabits: the material world and the 
world of the dominion. The physical heart exists in the material world, and the heart that 
is the knowing center of man, that contains his identity and can be called his soul, exists 
parallel to it in the world of the dominion.  
2.2.1.   Four Part Terminological Matrix of the Soul 
There are many models used to describe the heart in Islamic philosophy and 
several terms used to refer to it. I will explain the terminological framework that seems to 
be preferred by Imām al-Ghazālī briefly in this section so that our references to the heart 
can be properly understood later on. In Book 21 of the Iḥyā’, the Marvels of the Heart, 
Imām al-Ghazālī tells his readers: “know that there are four names that are used in these 
chapters” for the soul.110 These are: ‘heart’ (qalb); ‘spirit’ (rūḥ); ‘soul’ (nafs); and 
‘intelligence’ (ʿaql).111 Each shares in the meaning of the word ‘soul,’ which al-Ghazālī 
defines as: “a subtle tenuous substance of an ethereal spiritual sort (latīfa rabbāniyya 
rūḥāniyya), which is connected with the physical heart. This subtle tenuous substance is 
                                                
108 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” 201. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 156. 
109 T.J. Winter, "Foreword." Foreword to The Marvels of the Heart, by Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī (Louisville, USA: 
Fons Vitae, 2010), v. See also: Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” 202. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of 
Knowledge, 157. 
110 Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb ʿAjā’ib al-Qalb” in Iḥyā’ ʿUlūm al-Dīn. Vol. 5. (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2011), 
13. For translation, see: Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī, The Marvels of the Heart. Translated by Walter James Skellie 
(Louisville, USA: Fons Vitae, 2010), 5. 
111 Skellie, "Translator's Introduction." Introduction to The Marvels of the Heart, xvi. 
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the real essence of man.”112 Imām al-Ghazālī goes no further than defining his term and 
makes it clear that he will not be revealing the specifics of his metaphysic of the soul 
here, or, potentially, anywhere else: 
“We will guard against trying to explain…[its true nature] for two reasons: first, because it 
deals with mystical sciences (ʿulūm al-mukāshafa), and our aim in this book includes only the 
knowledge of proper conduct (ʿilm al-muʿāmala); and second, because to ascertain it calls for 
a disclosing of the spirit (rūḥ), concerning which the Messenger of God did not speak, and 
therefore no one else should speak.”113  
 
Imām al-Ghazālī himself warns us off this path of digging too far into the metaphysic of 
the soul, which is “a marvelous and lordly (rabbānī) affair, the real and ultimate nature of 
which most intellects (ʿuqūl) and understandings (afhām) are unable to grasp.”114  
Returning to our framework: Imām al-Ghazālī uses all four terms 
interchangeably, as the context demands, to refer to the soul. But each term also has an 
outward, physical definition of its own, which is not common to the others. These more 
literal definitions are, respectively, “the corporeal heart, the corporeal spirit, the 
appetitive soul, and intelligence.”115 Imām al-Ghazālī explains the whole framework in 
the following excerpt: 
“So now it is made clear to you that there exist the following meanings of these names: the 
corporeal heart, the corporeal spirit, the appetitive soul, and intelligence. These are four 
meanings that are denoted by four terms. There is also a fifth meaning, which is that subtle 
tenuous substance in man that knows and perceives, and all four of these names are 
successively applied to it.”116  
 








                                                
112 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb ʿAjā’ib al-Qalb,” 14. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Marvels of the Heart, 6. 
113 Ibid. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Marvels of the Heart, 6. 
114 Ibid, 16. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Marvels of the Heart, 7. 
115 Ibid, 18. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Marvels of the Heart, 9. 
116 Ibid, 18-9. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Marvels of the Heart, 9-10. 
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The soul: the “subtle tenuous substance” that is the essence of man 
 
  
Imām al-Ghazālī chooses to use the term ‘heart’ to refer to the subtle tenuous substance 
throughout this text; I will do the same, but note that these terms can be used 
interchangeably. Again, Imām al-Ghazālī makes it clear that he is not interested in 
expounding an ontology of the soul, or doing anything beyond stating its definition: 
“whenever we use the term ‘heart’ (qalb) in this book we mean by it this subtle tenuous 
substance…[but] what we propose is to mention its characteristics (awṣāf) and states 
(aḥwāl), not its real nature (haqīqa) in itself, for the science of practical religion does not 
require the mention of its real nature.”117 We will do no more than skirt around the 
ontology of the soul, for it is not our topic here, though we do need to refer to the soul to 
understand how knowledge enters into it. 
2.3.   The Passage of Knowledge into the Heart 
2.3.1.   Imām al-Ghazālī’s Spectrum of the Extra-mental and Mental Existence of 
Intelligibles 
The first question, that of how man knows or comes to know, is a much more 
complicated one, and the subject of this entire thesis. For the sake of situating ourselves, 
let us set out some key principles here. In the 21st book of his Iḥyā, Sharḥ ʿAjā’ib al-
Qalb, Imām al-Ghazālī provides us with another framework, this time for the degrees of 
                                                
117 Ibid, 14-5. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Marvels of the Heart, 6. 
 االلررححييمم٬،  االلححممدد للللهه االلذذيي ففضضّلل ببننيي آآددمم ببااللععللمم ووااللععمملل ععللىى ججممييعع االلععااللمم٬،ببسسمم االلللهه االلررححممنن 
  ووااللصصللااةة ووااللسسللاامم ععللىى ممححممدد سسييدد االلععرربب ووااللععججمم ووععللىى آآللهه ووأأصصححااببهه ييننااببييعع االلععللوومم ووااللححككمم




existence, which are four.118 This second model blends ontology and epistemology, and 
will help us understand the passage of intelligibles into the seat of knowledge. These four 
degrees represent the kinds of existence a thing may have and can be used to mark its 
progression from God’s knowledge to ours: the first degree is “existence in the Preserved 
Tablet...real (haqīqī) existence follows this, and it is followed in turn by its imaginative 
existence...the existence of its image in the imagination. Its imaginative existence is 
followed by its intellectual existence...the existence of its image within the heart.”119 The 
Preserved Tablet is a record of all of God’s revelation and the content of His decree for 
His creation, which exists in the world of the dominion. It represents a portion of God’s 
knowledge, and would contain a reflection of every existent thing, both physical and 
metaphysical, such that there existence therein precedes, is simultaneous with, and 
follows their actual (haqīqī) existence (that is, their existence in the Tablet is maintained 
as long as the Tablet exists, irrespective of the status of their existence in external 
reality). The content of reality is available to be perceived by the human senses, both 
internal (mental) and external (sensory). Once it is perceived, there is a subtle but 
significant distinction between the existence of a thing in the imagination vs. its existence 
in the heart. In Imām al-Ghazālī’s psychology, the imagination is a faculty of the brain,120 
but knowledge inheres in the immaterial heart, which is the agent of knowing. 
Knowledge is not knowledge, but is mere perception until it is grasped by the heart. 
Imām al-Ghazālī expounds this view across his works; “for him, knowledge had degrees 
and dimensions, as well as an existential import that demands realization in the heart of 
the agent of knowledge.”121 
                                                
118 If it is difficult to understand these two frameworks in relation to one other, think of them as complementary: one 
determining how something exists (either corporeally or immaterially) and the other where it exits (i.e., the specific 
material or immaterial “place” it inhabits within those two realms).  
119 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb ʿAjā’ib al-Qalb,” 75. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Marvels of the Heart, 58-9. 
120 Skellie, “Translator's Introduction.” Introduction to The Marvels of the Heart, xxiii. 
121 Yusuf Hanson, "Imam Al-Ghazālī: the Proof of Islam." Foreword. The Book of Knowledge, xxi. 
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2.3.2.   When the Pattern Breaks: Divine Inspiration 
However - and this is crucial - the transfer of knowledge need not follow a direct, 
linear path through these degrees of existence. God may interfere and directly reveal 
knowledge to man from the Preserved Tablet: “whenever the veils are lifted between the 
heart and the Preserved Tablet, the heart sees the things which are therein, and knowledge 
bursts forth into it therefrom, so that it does not have to acquire its knowledge through the 
avenues of the senses.”122 From this perspective, the physical world itself and the senses 
are veils separating us from this more direct path of knowledge acquisition, which is a 
kind of inspiration or revelation.123 Yet the latter could hardly be called education, though 
it constitutes a gain in knowledge, as it is granted by God as He wills without the external 
means generally associated with the process of education. Whatever the route the 
knowledge takes to reach it, man’s heart is a blank canvas,124 which is filled by God how 
and as He wills, whatever the means He uses to instill that knowledge there. The heart 
that is the seat of knowledge is, at birth, pure and unmarked.125 Imām al-Ghazālī quotes 
the following verse in relation to this: “And fear God. And God teaches you [2:282].”126 
God teaches man: He is the primary cause of knowledge entering the heart, no matter 
what its path, and the secondary causes can vary according to His will. 
2.3.3.   Another Way of Understanding the Process of Learning: the Metaphor of the 
Heart as Mirror 
The heart is the seat of knowledge, and in its capacity as such, it is like a mirror 
which reflects in it the true nature of things: this is knowledge. As al-Ghazālī describes it, 
the dynamic is as follows: first, there are things available to be known – these are the 
intelligibles (maʿlūmāt), which are the object of man’s knowledge. Then, there is that 
                                                
122 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb ʿAjā’ib al-Qalb,” 77. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Marvels of the Heart, 59. 
123 Al-Ghazālī, The Niche of Lights: A Parallel English-Arabic Text, 9. 
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which comes to know them: the heart, metaphorically referred to as a mirror. Finally, 
there is the act of knowing, which is intelligence, or knowledge as the verbal noun - 
knowing. Imām al-Ghazālī illustrates this using the metaphor of a mirror: 
“Even as the mirror is one thing, the forms of individuals another, and the representation 
of their image in the mirror another, being thus three things in all, so here, too, there are 
three things: the heart, the specific natures of things, and the representation and presence 
of these in the heart. The ‘intelligible’ (al-maʿlūm) is an expression for the specific natures 
of things. ‘Intelligence’ (al-ʿilm) is an expression for the representation of the image in the 
mirror.”127  
  
The heart receives and contains knowledge, and its knowing is in its reflecting the 
knowledge that God brings to bear upon it. The “usual path which knowledge takes is 
from the Preserved Tablet through the other stages of existence to the heart, or spiritual 
centre of the individual.”128  
2.3.4.   Still Another Useful Metaphor: the Entry of Intelligibles into the Heart from Two 
Doors 
Imām al-Ghazālī uses many illustrations to describe the heart and its functions; 
one of these portrays it as a pool or well into which different streams of water flow.129 
Still another metaphor he uses to depict the way knowledge comes to be reflected in, or 
enters, the heart: it describes two doors that open into the heart and allow knowledge to 
enter it from different sources. He writes that “the heart has two doors. One door opens 
toward the world of spirits (ʿālam al-malakūt)…the other door opens toward the five 
external senses that are tethered to the visible material world.”130 The access we have to 
the realm of spirits is through our hearts and the door that opens up to them from it. The 
door opens out to the corporeal world, and involves the use of the five external senses, 
but also the five internal senses, which are housed in the physical brain according to 
Imām al-Ghazālī, and which facilitate both empirical and a priori knowledge.131 The door 
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opening to the spiritual realm allows revealed knowledge to enter into the heart, and this 
is its exclusive entry point. As Imām al-Ghazālī notes, “the fact that the door of the heart 
is opened to the acquisition of knowledge through the senses is a thing you understand,” 
but the door opening to revealed knowledge is harder to grasp, as it is metaphysical, and 
our door is nothing but a metaphor to help us grasp something beyond us.132 The 
confusion around it is exacerbated by the nature of the realm of spirits itself, which is 
“boundless, consisting of those secrets hidden from the sight of the eyes and perceived 
only by insight.”133 We will discuss the nature of that insight in Chapter Four, when we 





                                                
132 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb ʿAjā’ib al-Qalb,” 77. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Marvels of the Heart, 60. 
133 Ibid, 45. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Marvels of the Heart, 40. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  
IMĀM AL-GHAZĀLĪ’S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE  
3.1.   What is Knowledge? 
3.1.1.   There are Countless Ways in which Knowledge is Understood 
When wading into the vast epistemology of the Islamic knowledge tradition, the 
issue of what knowledge is can be approached from many different angles; knowledge is 
described in numerous different ways in Islamic thought, and it would be near impossible 
to offer a simple, single-sentence definition, even as a starting point for this thesis. Imām 
al-Ghazālī discusses this problem in his Muṣtaṣfā, where he suggested that perhaps, “no 
definition of ‘knowledge’ was, in fact, possible.”134 I include the following long tradition 
related by Imām al-Ghazālī to illustrate the range of epistemic, ethical, and metaphysical 
themes that surround knowledge, and to give the reader a clear evidence of the 
importance of knowledge in Islam at the time of the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص:  
“Muʿādh b. Jabal said, concerning [the excellence of] teaching and seeking knowledge, and I 
have seen it narrated directly from the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, ‘Pursue knowledge, for pursuing it is 
reverence to God, seeking it is devotion, studying it with others is glorification (tasbīḥ), 
searching it out is striving in the path of God, teaching it to one who lacks knowledge is 
charity, bestowing it freely on those worthy of it brings proximity [to God]. [Knowledge] is 
an intimate companion in solitude, a friend in retreat, and a guide to religion; it heartens one 
in ease and difficulty; it is a vizier among noble companions and a close friend among 
strangers; it is a guiding light on the path to heaven. God elevates people [through 
knowledge], making them leaders, lords, and guides who are followed on the path of 
excellence; they are exemplars in goodness, their traces are followed closely and their 
comportment is closely noted; the angels seek out intimate friendship with them, and with 
their wings stroke them; every [creature] of the field or the desert seeks forgiveness for them, 
even the fish and the sea snakes of the oceans, the wild animals of dry land and its grazing 
beasts, [even] the heaven and its stars. All this because knowledge is the life of the heart 
[protecting it] from blindness, the light of eyesight [protecting it] from darkness, and the 
strength of the body [sustaining it] from weakness. The servant attains through it the stations 
of the upright and the loftiest degrees. Reflection on it equals fasting, and studying it with 
others equals devotion [i.e., supererogatory prayers] through the night. Through it God is 
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obeyed, by it He is worshipped, by it His unity is affirmed, by it He is lauded, and by it He is 
approached with piety. By it family ties are maintained, and by it the lawful and unlawful are 
known. Knowledge is the leader, and deeds his followers. Those who will be happy are 
inspired by it, and those who will be miserable are kept from it’”135  
 
The content of this long tradition can and has been expanded upon in volumes, but to 
pick from all of this one facet and designate it the singular “understanding of knowledge 
in Islam” would be arbitrary and inaccurate. For that reason, the most we can do, 
particularly in our limited space here, is indicate certain useful themes to ground our 
discussion and proceed from there.  
3.1.2.   True Knowledge is Knowledge of God  
Imām al-Ghazālī puts forward several overarching frameworks describing 
knowledge across his various texts, but a foundational idea for each of these is that true 
knowledge is knowledge of God, since, “for Imām al-Ghazālī, the quest for truth was 
ultimately a search for God.”136 He asserts this in the Book of Knowledge, stating that 
“the most noble and the true goal of all the sciences is the realization of God.”137 This is 
because the quest for truth is a quest to understand reality as it is, and God, as the Creator 
of the universe and the Ultimately Real (al-Ḥaqq), is at the center of that quest. Recall 
what we have said as knowledge being both a means and an end. The best of knowledge 
that is a means to an end is knowledge whose end is proximity to God, that draws one 
closer to Him. Knowledge that is an end in and of itself is the knowledge of God itself. In 
either case, for knowledge to be considered true knowledge, God must be its object.  
3.2.   The Division of Knowledge into the Knowledge of Conduct and the Knowledge 
of Unveiling 
Expanding upon this dual understanding of knowledge, Imām al-Ghazālī writes in 
The Book of Knowledge that true knowledge “can be divided into knowledge of one’s 
                                                
135 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” 46. Found in Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Jāmiʿ  bayān al-ʿilm wa-faḍlih, 268. It is also 
described as a statement of Mu‘ādh b. Jabal himself. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 22-3. 
136 Yusuf Hanson, "Imam Al-Ghazālī: the Proof of Islam." Foreword. The Book of Knowledge, xxi. 
137 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” 194. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 150. 
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conduct (muʿāmalāt) [with people and God] and knowledge of unveiling (mukāshafa) [of 
the unseen realm].”138 The former, knowledge as a means, is what Imām al-Ghazālī calls 
the knowledge of the path to the hereafter, and it is “that which in itself is essential to the 
religion.”139 He dedicates the entirety of his magnum opus, the Iḥyā’, to the content of 
this first category: the knowledge of proper conduct with mankind and God, and the 
internal meanings underlying that conduct’s external forms - that is, “the marvels and 
wonders comprised in the beliefs and actions, and their benefits, which render hearts 
lucid, pure, untainted, sanctified, and sound so they can ascend to God’s proximity and 
partake of the gentle winds of His beneficence.”140 The latter category, the knowledge of 
unveiling, is knowledge that is an end in and of itself, and “the science of [proper] 
conduct is merely a path that leads to [that] unveiling.”141 What is this knowledge? The 
most straightforward description to be found in The Book of Knowledge is the following:  
“Here I mean the knowledge of unveiling which is interpreted as a light that appears in the 
heart when it is cleansed and purified of blameworthy traits. Through that light, certain 
matters are unveiled. Previously, one used to hear the names for these matters, and then 
imagine vague meanings for them without clarity. Then at the moment they [the meanings] 
become clear, such that realization (maʿrifa) can be obtained of the essence of God (s), His 
eternal consummate attributes, His works, His wisdom in the creation of [this] world and the 
hereafter, and His preference for the hereafter over [this] world…”142  
 
It is best described as an unveiling, the end result of attaining religious knowledge and 
spiritual training, though it is ultimately granted by God and thus may occur without 
these requisite processes or withheld even when they are completed. It is experiential: 
one cannot attain it by hearing it described or understanding the way it works, only 
through the experience itself. During that experience, a “cover is raised until the evident 
truth in these matters manifests [itself] as clearly as if it were seen by the eye, leaving 
                                                
138 Ibid, 56. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 32.  
139 Ibid, 81. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 54. 
140 Ibid, 117-8. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 85. 
141 Ibid, 14. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, xlv. 
142 Ibid, 76. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 49. On this topic, see also: ʿAbd al-Karīm ibn 
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therein no doubt whatsoever.”143 This knowledge is the end goal of the Sufis, and the 
science of taṣawwuf focuses on its attainment through spiritual purification.  
3.2.1.   The Extent to which the Knowledge of Unveiling can be Spoken of or Understood 
is Limited 
The knowledge of unveiling, or “esoteric knowledge (ʿilm al-bāṭin)...is the 
culmination of all the fields of knowledge...The smallest share of it is to affirm its 
veracity and consent to it for those who have a share in it...the smallest penalty for 
whoever denies this [knowledge] is that he will be afforded no part of it.”144 A minimum 
requirement of attaining it is firm belief in the reality of its existence, though the content 
of such knowledge can only be referenced laterally. This is because no amount of words 
can convey anything but a peripheral understanding of it, since it  
“is not the knowledge written in books, nor does one graced with something of it speak 
openly of it except with people similar to him, who are associated with him, through counsel 
or in secret. This is the hidden knowledge that [the Messenger of God, ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص] intended by his 
words, ‘There is a knowledge with a hidden aspect, none know of it but the people of the 
realization of God most High; when they speak of it, those heedless of God pay it no 
attention.”145 
 
The difference between knowing this type of knowledge by having it described to one 
and knowing it through experience is like the difference between understanding the 
causes of good health or satiety and actually being in good health or satiated.146 One 
ought only to describe the knowledge of unveiling in words to the people capable of 
understanding and, eventually, achieving it. Imām al-Ghazālī cautions that it is “not 
permitted to record in writing, although it is the ultimate aim of saints and the ultimate 
aim of the sincere.”147 For this reason, the knowledge that is an end in and of itself (and 
                                                
143 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” 78. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 51. 
144 Ibid, 75-6. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 48-9. 
145 Ibid, 78-9. Found in Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī, Qūt al-Qulūb, 1:175. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of 
Knowledge, 51. 
146 Al-Ghazālī, Al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl wa’l-Mufṣiḥ bi’l-Aḥwāl, 99. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, Deliverance 
from Error, 78. 
147 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” 24. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, xlv. See also: Al-
Ghazālī, Ayyuhā’l-Walad, 95. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, Letter to a Disciple, 24. 
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therefore of the highest value)148 is not the subject of Imām al-Ghazālī’s Book of 
Knowledge, nor does it feature heavily in any other of the other discussions of knowledge 
that intersperse his many texts. He refers to it, as we have seen in the quotes above, only 
to point it out and gives his readers nothing more than rudimentary descriptions. If we 
take Imām al-Ghazālī’s word for it, he had been granted some portion of this knowledge, 
more than he writes on the matter:   
“In the course of those periods of solitude things impossible to enumerate or detail in depth 
were disclosed to me. This much I shall mention...I knew with certainty that the Sufis are 
those who uniquely follow the way to God Most High, their mode of life is the best of all, 
their way the most direct of ways, and their ethic the purest...all their motions and 
quiescences, exterior and interior, are learned from the light of the niche of prophecy.”149 
 
It is highly likely that he would have shared more than this with his elite students 
verbally, but, as he says, the extent to which such things can be conveyed is limited.  
3.2.2.   Imām al-Ghazālī’s Works Primarily Take into Hand the Knowledge of Proper 
Conduct 
The type of knowledge with which Imām al-Ghazālī concerns himself in his 
writing is the first category, what he calls the knowledge of proper conduct (ʿilm al-
muʿāmala). This then divides into two categories, knowledge dealing with outward states 
and knowledge dealing with inward states.150 The first as encompasses the aspects of 
man’s external life - the form of his ritual acts, the ethics of his conduct with others 
(which I will refer to as social ethics), securing the health of his body through proper 
living, and, generally, the organization of his material life. The second deals with the 
aspects of his internal life - the meaning behind his ritual acts, his relationship with God, 
securing the health of his soul by building virtue and avoiding vice, and, generally, the 
organization of his spiritual life.  
 
                                                
148 Since “that which is sought for itself alone is of higher value and superior to that which is sought for [something] 
other than itself,” Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” 47. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 24. 
149 Al-Ghazālī, Al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl wa’l-Mufṣiḥ bi’l-Aḥwāl, 105-6. For translation, see: Abū Hāmid Al-
Ghazālī, Deliverance from Error, 81. 
150 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” 13-4. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, xlv. 
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3.3.   The Classification of the Sciences 
3.3.1.   Imām al-Ghazālī’s Criteria in Ranking the Sciences   
Imām al-Ghazālī spends a good portion of The Book of Knowledge subdividing 
and ranking the various disciplines that fall under these categories, classifying them as 
communal or individual obligations. There are many religious sciences to be organized, 
as “Islam as a whole underwent an exceptionally rapid phase of scholastic elaboration in 
which a powerful armoury of religious sciences appeared such as Ḥadīth, jurisprudence 
and Kalām theology...through which the religion became radically formalized and 
systematized.”151 Just as with understanding the nature of knowledge itself, there are 
many ways to approach the division and ranking of these sciences, and Imām al-Ghazālī 
applies a few criteria in his various categorizations. Typically, “the (Muslim) 
philosophers classify sciences on the basis of their epistemological nature and according 
to the different grades of their subjects, while al-Ghazali applies an external criterion - 
their usefulness in attaining religious ends beyond themselves.”152 He ranks them on the 
same normative spectrum that the sharīʿa uses to classify all human acts: on a scale from 
required to forbidden, with each of the sciences labeled as praiseworthy or blameworthy 
on the basis of their relative benefit or harm. This is Imām al-Ghazālī’s primary 
consideration in valuing the disciplines or sciences: he writes that “the sciences are of 
varying gradations. Some carry the servant along on his path to God, others support his 
quest in one way or another; they also have well-ordered stages arranged according to 
proximity and distance from the objective and they have guardians who uphold their 
integrity.”153 He applies the same criterion - that is, the benefit of each discipline - to 
secular fields of knowledge (ʿulūm ghayr sharʿiyya), which, when employed in the 
service of human well-being, become normative (read: religious).154 Thus, the 
blameworthy-praiseworthy knowledge divide is not in line with the secular-religious 
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153 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” 192. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 148. 
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knowledge divide; rather, “the blameworthy category...is that in which there is no benefit, 
neither in religion nor in the worldly life, or its harm overcomes its benefit, like the 
knowledge of sorcery, talismans, and astrology.”155 This provides some explanation for 
the fact that one of the common prayers of the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص was to seek protection from 
knowledge that does not benefit.156 
3.3.2.   The Instrumental Sciences 
Some sciences, both secular and religious (sharʿiyya), are instruments for 
attaining others, and should not be looked down upon as insignificant, especially by “one 
whose goal is [proximity to God, who] will seek - without a doubt - the closest [science] 
to his goal...Given this, it is inappropriate for him to regard any of the sciences with 
disdain.”157 Nor is specialization in these fields to be looked down upon, “for those 
[scholars] who take on the responsibility for these fields are similar to those men who 
man the fortresses and those who reside and serve therein...not one of them will go 
unrewarded as long as their intention is that the word of God be raised to its utmost; not 
the acquisition of spoils of war.”158 This work is considered a communal obligation, thus 
it is not necessary for every scholar to be expanding the horizons of every single field at 
the same time: he or she must have a high level grasp of them and may then specialize 
beyond this in one or two. 
3.4.   Metaphors Used to Describe Knowledge 
3.4.1.   Knowledge is Life 
Beyond these practical divisions, knowledge is described using several 
metaphors, each highlighting its importance and value. The first of these compares 
knowledge to life, something God Himself does in the Qur’ān, calling knowledge “spirit 
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and life in His words...And is one who was dead and We gave him life and made for him 
light by which to walk among the people like one who is in darkness, never to emerge 
therefrom? [6:122].”159 Imām ʿAlī, the cousin of the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص and one of the four 
righteous caliphs that led the Muslims after his passing, said in verse: “the people are 
dead and the people of knowledge are the living.”160 The life that knowledge maintains is 
the life of the soul - of the heart. Imām al-Ghazālī relates the following on this point: 
“Fatḥ al-Mawṣilī asked, ‘Will not a sick person who is prevented from nourishment, 
water, and medicine die?’ They said, ‘Indeed.’ He said, ‘The heart likewise, when it is 
prevented from attaining wisdom and knowledge for three days, dies.’”161 Ignorance, 
parallel to this, is linked with death: “ignorance of God Most High is the heart’s deadly 
poison.”162 A soul marred by ignorance is diseased, and it can only be healed at the hands 
of the knowledgeable, who are, in most cases, able to cure it, but only if the diseased 
person seeks out a cure.163 Imām al-Ghazālī argues that many of the ignorant suffer from 
an incurable disease, because receptivity to knowledge requires certain basic 
characteristics and capacities, which a good number of people lack.164 In order to avoid 
this, one must establish a diet of the right kinds of knowledge and pursue them 
throughout one’s life; if one does not, one’s end is clear. Spiritual death is the fate of 
anyone who starves their heart of knowledge, though this threat is, for most people, 
veiled by the concerns of external life. This is very dangerous, for the worries of the 
world are like fear, which, in the moment of injury, blinds us to the pain of wounds, but 
when we recover from the fear, we are awakened to the pain and the seriousness of our 
state. Similarly, the pain and death of our hearts become stark when the worries of the 
world are lifted at death.165  
                                                
159 Ibid, 306. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 249. 
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3.4.2.   Knowledge is Light 
As seen in the verse listed above, together with being described as life, knowledge 
is very often described as light. Another Qur’ānic example is verse [2:257], He brings 
them out from darkness into the light, in which darkness signifies ignorance and light, 
knowledge.166 Imām al-Ghazālī relates that Ibn Masʿūd said, “Knowledge is not a 
question of the quantity of narrations [one cites], it is a light cast into the heart.”167 There 
are countless examples of this comparison being made, and they not limited to relating 
knowledge itself or the content of knowledge with light, but also describe the 
knowledgeable (scholars) and the intellect itself as lights. Light is often used to describe 
elements of the unseen, both in the Qur’ān and in the Islamic tradition at large. Imām al-
Ghazālī has an entire text devoted to commentary on what has come to be called the 
Verse of Light (ayat al-nūr) - one of his most esoteric works, the Mishkāt al-Anwār. 
Because it attaches to so many referents, the metaphor is difficult to fully grasp, let alone 
parse or explain. Imām al-Ghazālī warns his readers about such matters, writing that they 
are “a matter of the domain of the science of unveiling” whose “discussion in the domain 
of the knowledge of conduct is inappropriate.”168 Here, it is sufficient to note that it is 
pervasive, perhaps nowhere more so than in Islamic epistemology: knowledge is a light 
cast into the heart by God, through which it sees - that is, understands.169  
3.4.3.   Knowledge is Happiness 
Finally, knowledge is happiness - that is, happiness is one of the fruits of 
knowledge. Imām al-Shāfiʿī, one of the great Imams after whom the four schools of legal 
thought are named, said, “The nobility of knowledge is such that, whoever it is attributed 
to, even in an insignificant amount, is joyful, and whoever it is withheld from is 
distraught.”170 We have said that knowledge is life and ignorance is death, and 
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knowledge is light and ignorance is darkness, so it will be easy for my reader to see why 
knowledge might be happiness and ignorance, misery. Knowledge is both a means to 
achieving ultimate happiness and a pleasure in and of itself.171 Imām al-Ghazālī speaks of 
the Joy of Comprehension, farḥ al-tafaṭṭun, experienced by students, which may be 
increased by anticipation if the teacher intimates certain teachings rather than relating 
them outright.172 The unadulterated pleasure associated with knowing and the discomfort 
and pain of ignorance is something known through experience - it is a piece of 
experiential knowledge that the modern reader is likely to have in common with Imām al-
Ghazālī.  
3.5.   The Nobility of Knowledge 
3.5.1.   Mankind’s Intellect Sets him Apart from all of Creation 
One of the most prevalent qualities of knowledge, mentioned throughout Imām al-
Ghazālī’s discourses thereon, is the nobility of knowledge. The reason for this is that the 
source of man’s nobility lies in his ability to know: his intellect is the capacity that sets 
him apart from other created beings, both worldly and otherworldly,173 and the means by 
which he distinguishes himself in relation to his fellow man.174 With regards to the first 
element, man’s nobility relative to other created beings, the distinguishing factor is that 
humans have the ability to reason and in reasoning, to perceive the consequences of their 
actions and act knowingly rather than being driven by desires and natural impulses 
alone.175 Thus the intellect provides the foundation for free will, and it is man’s intellect 
that allows him to take on the mantle of vicegerency on earth - the khilāfa granted him by 
God.176 The second element of nobility, what allows a person to distinguish him or 
herself from other humans, is achieved by acting on what the intellect elucidates. The 
                                                
171 Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam, 241. 
172 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” 211. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 165. 
173 Ibid, 29. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 10-1. 
174 Ibid, 26-7. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 8. 
175 Ibid, 312, 314. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 253, 255. 
176 Ibid, 52-3. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 28. 
 االلررححييمم٬،  االلححممدد للللهه االلذذيي ففضضّلل ببننيي آآددمم ببااللععللمم ووااللععمملل ععللىى ججممييعع االلععااللمم٬،ببسسمم االلللهه االلررححممنن 
  ووااللصصللااةة ووااللسسللاامم ععللىى ممححممدد سسييدد االلععرربب ووااللععججمم ووععللىى آآللهه ووأأصصححااببهه ييننااببييعع االلععللوومم ووااللححككمم




intellect allows man to approach God through willing obedience, gaining His pleasure 
and increasing in nobility. Thus the intellect lies within humankind as both a latent 
capacity, which grants man his innate nobility, and as a potential to be actualized, which 
grants man his earned nobility. We will find this borne out in the references to the 
intellect in the ḥadīth, in which the nobility of knowledge is linked to both the capacity to 
know - that is, the intellect itself - as well as knowledge gained and acted upon - that is, 
the content of knowledge. Imām al-Ghazālī explains that it is the capacity of the intellect 
that is meant in the following tradition related from the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص: “God created nothing 
more honored by Him than the intellect,” while it is the content of knowledge that is 
referred to in this tradition: “Increase in intellect, you will increase in proximity to your 
Lord.”177 Man’s proximity to his Lord is the measure of his ultimate nobility, and, 
according to a prophetic tradition, the intellect (when acted on in the best way) is what 
determines this.178 
3.5.2.   The Relationship between Knowledge and Prophecy 
The nobility of knowledge is further established by its association with 
prophethood. The association can be made loosely, by noting that the prophets sent by 
God to mankind throughout history were sent as guides, and therefore necessarily as 
teachers. It can also be made using textual evidence, for example with the oft-quoted 
ḥadīth, that calls the scholars the heirs of the prophets, as there is nothing higher than 
prophecy, and no bond stronger than that represented by ties of inheritance.179 God 
Himself poses this truth as a rhetorical question, commanding the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص to ask, in 
verse [39:9], Say, ‘Are those who know equal to those who do not know? The scholars 
carry out the mission of education begun by the prophets; they are the guides who now 
channel guidance safely to the port of understanding for the society at large. Imām al-
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Ghazālī relates another tradition in which the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص tells his followers that he was 
sent as a teacher.180 Through their association with one who was the best of mankind and 
with all the other prophets, those who possess knowledge surpass the mere worshipper as 
the light of the moon outshines that of the stars.181 In Islam, even the category of the 
martyrs, whose ultimate sacrifice is immensely rewarded, is outranked by the scholars, 
whose ink, it is said “will be weighed against the blood of the martyrs, wherein the ink of 
the scholars will prove weightier than the blood of the martyrs.”182 One who dies seeking 
this most noble of things with the goal of reviving the religion, dies with but one step 
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THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE 
4.1.   The Primary Source of Knowledge 
4.1.1.   God is the Primary Cause of Knowledge Entering the Heart 
It should now be more than obvious to my reader why knowledge is sought from 
the Islamic perspective, but not yet from where. There are several sources of knowledge - 
what Mayer calls “the channels of knowledge.”184 We have mentioned that the primary 
source of knowledge is God, the Cause of all causes. Every other source of knowledge is 
a secondary means, which the Muslim lends no causal credence to without attributing its 
creation at every instantiation to God.185 Recall the Qur’ānic evidence Imām al-Ghazālī 
cites in this context, verse [2:282]: And fear God. And God teaches you.186 Another 
Qur’ānic reference to this is expanded upon in a ḥadīth:  
“After reciting His words, So whoever God wants to guide, He expands his breast to 
[contain] Islam [6:125]. Someone asked, ‘O Messenger of God, what is this ‘expansion’?’ He 
replied, ‘When the light descends into the heart, it expands its center so that it becomes 
spacious.’”187 
 
This could refer to the direct unveiling of meanings to the heart, or to the creation of the 
light of the intellect (that is, the capacity to perceive meaning) therein. In his 
autobiography, The Deliverance from Error, Imām al-Ghazālī seems to understand the 
latter meaning from it, because in relating the same tradition, he adds to it the following 
commentary: “it is this of which the Apostle - God’s blessing and peace be upon him! - 
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said: ‘God Most High created men in darkness, then sprinkled on them some of His 
light.’ From that light, then, the unveiling of truth must be sought.”188 This interpretation 
seems to refer to the capacity of the intellect as a light by whose means the truth is 
understood. We saw elsewhere that this process could be bypassed by God revealing 
knowledge directly to the heart. However, regardless of whether God, in teaching, guides 
knowledge into the heart through the external means of learning or reveals knowledge to 
it directly, it is He Who is the primary Cause of this illumination. We may think of God’s 
teaching - His acting as the primary cause - as the trunk of a tree representing the sources 
of knowledge. Beyond this, the trunk breaks off into two main branches: reason and 
revelation, which then separate further into smaller branches (we might, for example, 
consider empirical knowledge, or knowledge derived through logical proof two branches 
of reason, while the signs revealed in nature or experiential knowledge gained through 
spiritual purification189 might be branches of revelation). An analysis of the true nature of 
reason and revelation in Islamic thought, without even entering into their complex 
interplay, could fill volumes. For the purposes of this thesis, it is sufficient for us to have 
a basic grasp of what they are.  
4.2.   The Secondary Sources of Knowledge 
4.2.1.   Reason 
By reason, we mean the “inherent inward quality by which humankind is 
differentiated from the animals, and through which they comprehend the true nature of 
reality,”190 what we referred to above as the capacity of the intellect, whose seat is in the 
heart. It is through this capacity that man comprehends: the intellect is the lens that filters 
all sensory inputs from the world outside of himself, adds to these depth and dimension 
through the internal senses (the various mental processes comprising thought), and 
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provides him with a view of the content of reality. Imām al-Ghazālī considers the 
intellect to be crucial: it is “the source of knowledge, its point of origin and its 
foundation; knowledge springs forth from it like fruit from a tree…[like] vision from the 
eye.”191 He does this in many places - uses the metaphor of eyesight to help his reader 
understand the nature of the intellect: parallel to our physical capacity to see, there exists 
our internal capacity to comprehend.192 The strength of the intellect varies both within a 
person - it may change as he or she grows, or works to expand it; or may fade as he or she 
ages, or fails to train it.193 It also varies between different people - some have been 
created with stronger intellects than others, just as some have been created with stronger 
eyesight than others.194 Many suffer from impaired intellects - a very dangerous 
condition. Blindness of the intellect threatens a person’s well-being more than physical 
blindness, for the intellect directs the human much the same way a rider guides a mount: 
blindness in the rider, the guide, has worse consequences than blindness in the mount.195 
As Imām al-Ghazālī points out, the impairment of the intellect is referred to as blindness 
in the Qur’ān as well, in verse [22:46]: For indeed, it is not eyes that are blinded, but 
blinded are the hearts which are within the breasts.196 Blindness of the intellect leaves 
the soul in a state of infancy, its growth permanently stunted by its inability to consume 
the knowledge it thrives on.  
4.2.2.   Revelation 
The prophets, the Prophet Muḥammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص being the foremost of them, were 
granted the most powerful intellects of all mankind - those who make judgments to the 
contrary by comparing the Prophet’s ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص intellect with their stereotypes of rural Bedouin 
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are sorely mistaken.197 The prophets were sent to guide mankind; their intellects perfect 
and correct the flawed intellects of those they lead.198 This serves to protect the 
knowledge that is revealed to them by lending it additional strength. However, that 
revealed knowledge - revelation being one of two main branches of our tree representing 
the sources of knowledge - reaches them through a capacity beyond reason. The prophets 
were possessed of complete intellects and were given, in addition to this, the ability to 
grasp knowledge beyond that available to reason alone. Imām al-Ghazālī describes this as 
a stage in which “an eye is opened by which a special perception of certain perceptibles is 
had; from the perception of these reason is excluded, just as hearing is from the 
perception of colors, and sight from the perception of sounds.”199 Again, both reason and 
revelation are God-given, but we may consider the latter to be, putting a metaphysical 
reality rather facilely, granted directly. What the prophets have access to through this 
capacity - revelation from God - is certain knowledge, in which there is no doubt.200 
Revelation represents reality in a manner truer-to-life than the conclusions of the intellect 
alone, as “it was related from Ibn Masʿūd in a report stemming from him and also traced 
back to the Prophet, ‘There are two realities only: speech and guidance. The best speech 
is the word of God, and the best guidance is the guidance of the Messenger of God 
 Though Imām al-Ghazālī does not delve into a classification of the kinds and 201”.ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص
degrees of revelation (which are many) in The Book of Knowledge, he does relate the 
experience of revelation to the category of experiential knowledge hovering in the 
background of his epistemology. He asserts that true knowledge of prophecy can only be 
achieved by pursuing the experiential knowledge gained through spiritual purification, 
because that is the only thing that can give one a taste of what the prophets 
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experienced.202 Thus “direct personal evidence of the reality of the prophetic faculty is 
actually provided through the practice of Sufism...Sufism provides certain privileged 
individuals with direct proof that prophecy is possible, and the continuing presence of 
such individuals in the midst of Muslim society amounts to...on-going evidence for the 
faithful.”203 This was how Imām al-Ghazālī cured his own doubts about prophecy, over 
the course of a spiritual journey that his intellect alone could not help him complete.204 
For man, whose intellect is like his eyesight, the content of revealed knowledge 
transmitted to him by the prophets and their heirs, the scholars, is the light that, falling 
upon the world, allows the eyesight to see: “the relationship of the Qur’ān and the law to 
this innate inclination [the intellect] in guiding it to the unveiling of the sciences related 
to it is like sunlight to eyesight.”205 Just as man is blind without his eyesight, without the 
guiding light of revelation he is also effectively blind: when bereft of revealed knowledge 
he is left in utter darkness and his ability to see (that is, reason) is of no use to him.  
4.2.3.   Knowledge Must be Sought through Both  
A comprehensive understanding of reality as it truly is requires that man be open 
to each source of knowledge; they do not work in opposition, nor do they work in 
isolation. One without the other is incomplete: “it is a delusion…to think that reason can 
alone and by itself attain to the fullness of truth, for the guidance of revelation is required. 
For this, one needs reason and revelation together; the one cannot do without the 
other.”206 Thus, neither the intellect nor revealed knowledge alone suffice a Muslim 
seeking knowledge: only in combination do they produce fruit. The first reason for this is 
that, barring the direct experience of having something of the unseen revealed to him (an 
unlikely occurrence without high level spiritual training and purification), and perhaps 
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even then, a person first establishes his or her faith in prophecy through the function of 
the intellect. Such a person, when faced with the claims to revelation made by the 
prophets or with the transmitted knowledge passed from the scholars to him or her, is 
moved “to investigate and to contemplate. It robs him of calmness and contentment...it 
impresses upon him that death is surely coming, that what is after death is hidden from 
the eyes of mankind, and that what the prophets related is not beyond the realm of 
possibility. Thus it is judicious to abandon any procrastination in discovering the truth of 
the matter.”207 It is the intellect, searching for truth after being faced with the possibility 
of revealed knowledge, that establishes the foundation for faith. Imām al-Ghazālī follows 
a mind through this thought process of reasoned faith in detail in the following passage 
from al-Iqtiṣād fī’l-Iʿtiqād:  
“It is incumbent upon us, without a doubt, to know whether we indeed have a Lord. And if 
we do, is it possible that He is a sayer in order to command and forbid, assign obligations, 
and send messengers? And if He is a sayer, is He powerful so as to punish and reward if we 
obey or disobey Him? And if He is powerful, is this specific person truthful in saying ‘I am 
the messenger to you’? If this becomes clear for us, then it is definitely incumbent upon us, 
if we are rational, to be cautious, look out for ourselves, and devalue this perishing worldly 
life in relation to the everlasting hereafter. For the prudent is the one who prepares for his 
hereafter and is not deluded by his worldly life.”208 
 
A person who reaches intellectual maturity with the coming of age of the body is able to 
open the eyes of his insight to the bright lights of reality - the created world, which is a 
mosaic of the signs of God. What does he understand from it? How does he deal with the 
claims of revealed knowledge he comes across therein? The verification of such claims at 
this stage is through the affirmation of the intellect. This is why the first religious 
obligation on a person reaching puberty is knowing affirmation of the creed of Islam.209 
Thus faith and reason are intimately linked; as the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص is reported to have said that 
“a person’s worthy character...is not complete until his intellect is made whole, 
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whereupon his faith becomes whole...”210 Imām al-Ghazālī describes both man’s reason 
and his propensity to seek out and understand his Creator - his faith - as being innate 
tendencies laid in him by God; reason, then, is necessarily involved in the process of 
returning to knowledge of Him.211  
The second reason that the intellect must be brought to bear on revealed 
knowledge is that a powerful mind is necessary to understand and interpret revelation, 
otherwise revealed knowledge cannot be trusted or acted upon.212 Thus students of 
knowledge must work to hone their natural ability to reason through the study of 
grammar, logic, and rhetoric during their youth before moving on to more advanced 
religious sciences.213 A person who approaches the religion without a sharp, active 
intellect will fail to grasp anything but its external shell, and will be forever cut off from 
its true depth and the beauty of its countless meanings.214 This is because the sharīʿa 
without the work of the intellect applied to it is like an eye without light cast upon it.215 
Furthermore, blind devotion to revealed truths without insight or experiential knowledge 
is heavy on the student of knowledge, a fact Imām al-Ghazālī opines towards the end of 
The Book of Knowledge, writing: “the realities discussed here should be apparent to 
anyone who regards them with the light of insight, but [they are] opaque and 
burdensome, however, for one who takes only from the readily available transmitted 
reports and initiated customs.”216 This is not simply his opinion on the matter - he quotes 
the following ḥadīth as evidence for the importance of the intellect in understanding the 
religion: “The Messenger of God ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said, ‘O people, comprehend your Lord and counsel 
one another to engage the intellect [in their affairs], through this you will grasp what you 
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have been commanded to do and what you have been forbidden to do.”217 From this, 
from the many instances in the Qur’ān where mankind is told to use his reason,218 and 
from the various galvanizing pieces of evidence Imām al-Ghazālī produces on this 
matter, we see that man’s intellect must be brought to bear upon faith for his religion to 
be truly realized. Still, “reason alone is incapable of fully grasping all problems or of 
getting to the heart of all difficulties.”219 There is a balance to be achieved between 
reason and revelation, between independent thought and submission to the word of the 
prophets, which the true scholars strive to achieve; they add to this balance the kind 
spiritual work that opens the horizon of experiential knowledge up for them and reveals 
to them the hidden meanings behind the apparent knowledge they already possess.220 
4.3.   Some of the Tertiary Sources of Knowledge 
4.3.1.   Knowledge is Taken from Men 
As we move from the secondary sources of knowledge to the tertiary sources, we 
are moving from the general to the specific. One source of knowledge that features on 
both sides of our tree (in that it relates to both reason and revelation) is the guidance God 
reveals to humankind through humans. Whether derived from reason or revelation or 
both, much of knowledge is passed down through people, and thus sought from people. A 
primary source of proof for this is the Qur’ānic verse occurring at both [16:43] and 
[21:7], “So ask the people of the message [who have knowledge] if you do not know.”221 
We have seen previously that the people of knowledge - the scholars - are the heirs of the 
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Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, and as such, inherit from him the work of guiding and teaching the society at 
large.222 Without them and the knowledge they convey, the path through this life to the 
next is treacherous, almost impossible to traverse safely.223 All of humanity walks that 
path, though precious few are competent guides. The stations of those on it are four: “a 
man who knows and knows that he knows, he is a scholar, so follow him; a man who 
knows yet does not know that he knows, he is asleep, wake him; a man who does not 
know and knows he does not know, he is seeking correct guidance, so teach him; and a 
man who does not know and does not know he does not know, such a person is ignorant, 
shun him.”224  
This brings us to the question of authority in Islam. God’s guidance of mankind 
by means of his fellow man occurs through the prophets and, as an extension of this, 
through their heirs or emissaries, the scholars.225 The prophets have absolute authority 
within their communities, and those that follow them bear a part of that authority, but not 
all of it. On this point, Imām al-Ghazālī quotes the following statement of one of the early 
Muslims: “Whatever came to us from the Messenger of God ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص we accept 
wholeheartedly, whatever came to us from the Companions [some matters] we take from 
them and [some] we decline, whatever came to us from the Followers; well, they are 
people and we are people.”226 Though their authority is not absolute, we follow the 
teachings of the Companions of the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص because they are reflections of the content 
of prophecy.227 The true scholars, likewise, embody the traditions of the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص and 
are also vessels of his guidance. The person walking the path of knowledge, with its 
many pitfalls, necessarily must do so with a guide. Guides are authoritative figures, who 
have the requisite wisdom and knowledge to navigate both themselves and others to 
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safety. Imām al-Ghazālī expresses the common Islamic theme of reliable chains of 
scholarship when he comments that the guide is someone “who has been the disciple of a 
person possessed of insight whose discipleship is part of a chain leading back to the 
Master of the Messengers 228”.ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص Only the truly knowledgeable scholars will lead a 
traveler on this path aright.229 
However, in order to be truly knowledgeable, it is not sufficient that one should 
display a strong grasp of the various concepts that make up the sciences: the true scholars 
are those who act on their knowledge and lead ethical lives informed by it, otherwise 
what they know cannot properly be called knowledge.230 The true scholars of the past 
combined their vast knowledge of jurisprudence and theology with knowledge of ethics 
and spiritual purification; they lived ascetic lives of righteous servanthood to God, 
seeking through their knowledge and teaching His Countenance.231 From such people, a 
diligent student can learn the external content of the sciences, but he or she can also learn 
good character by emulating them and can even derive experiential knowledge simply by 
being in their blessed presence.232 The state of the teacher is reflected in the student just 
as an engraved stamp marks soft clay,233 so the student must be cautious in selecting the 
person he or she takes as a guide,234 for the blind cannot lead the blind.235 Once a student 
has found a teacher in whose knowledge and moral stature he or she trusts, he or she 
becomes pliable in the teacher’s hands, giving precedence to the teacher’s opinions over 
their own much as the patient allows the physician to determine his care.236 Yet even such 
transformative teachers do not command the absolute obedience of the believer: that kind 
of obedience is reserved  for the prophets alone, as they are the only infallible humans. 
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Imām al-Ghazālī relates from Ibn ʿAbbās: “Knowledge can be taken from any given 
person, or declined, except from the Messenger of God 237”.ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص This is a very delicate 
balance; corruption amongst the scholars is rampant in Imām al-Ghazālī’s time,238 and 
though he did much to guide and revive, the preservation and transmission of knowledge 
in our time is in a far, far worse state.239  
4.3.2.   Knowledge is Taken Wherever it is Found 
Though the danger of the corrupt scholar is serious, the wise student takes true 
knowledge wherever it may appear; God’s signs can be found throughout creation. 
Paraphrasing a ḥadīth, Imām al-Ghazālī writes: “wisdom is the lost object of the believer; 
he seizes it whenever he has the opportunity.”240 If he recognizes something true on the 
tongue of a liar, he does not deny or reject that truth simply because of the place where it 
was manifested: like a piece of real gold amongst counterfeits, knowledge maintains its 
value regardless of its proximity to falsehoods.241 Truth, being ultimately delivered by 
God, may be manifested wherever He pleases. It is His wont to send forth “gusts of 
grace,” and the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص commanded his followers: “put yourselves in the way of 
them!”242 If the gusts are knowledge, then the student must take them as they come. 
Partisan, wholesale denial of what people outside of our intellectual or religious circles 
say corners us into denying the very truths that make up our ideologies - to abandon those 
truths in order to protect them is foolishness.243 Imām al-Ghazālī acted on this principle 
throughout his life; from childhood, he was driven by an innate desire to know the truth 
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as it was, not adhere to the claims of others out of blind, “servile conformism.”244 His 
life’s work reflects this practice in that it was highly assimilative: 
“He is wholly uninterested in intellectual partisanship for its own sake and his concern is 
always with validity and intellectual merit wherever it may be found. He thus rarely rejects a 
school’s teachings outright. Rather, at the exoteric level he fiercely suppresses whatever in 
them he deems at odds with the formal norms of religio revelata, but as the esoteric level of 
his thought is approached...elements of these very doctrines are absorbed and enrich his 
thinking. The broad trend is thus to rescue insights from ‘heretical’ contexts and integrate 
them into a totalized Islam.”245 
  
Imām al-Ghazālī had a uniquely powerful mind, one fit for the great task of separating 
the wheat from the chaff when it came to the truth value of the claims of different schools 
of thought. Perhaps this is beyond most students of the Islamic sciences, but his 
recommendation for them is still that they seek the truth at every opportunity, wherever it 
may be found. The intelligent man, as ʿAlī was reported to have said, does not locate the 
truth by identifying the knowledgeable man - he identifies the knowledgeable man 
through the truth.246 
4.3.3.   The Place of Empirical Knowledge in Imām al-Ghazālī’s Epistemology  
The type of knowledge that forms the backbone of the scientistic worldview, 
empirical knowledge,247 features in the Islamic epistemic as an offshoot of reason.248 
Imām al-Ghazālī refers to the empirical sciences as ʿulūm al-tajārub and describes them 
as “the sciences derived through the observation of events and circumstances as they 
arise.”249 The content of this branch of knowledge is not stable, as it is bound to vary 
according to the measurement and the perception of the person deriving it from his or her 
surroundings, not to mention from the changes in those material surroundings.250 The 
Islamic understanding of causality leaves the mainstream Muslim (if he is apprised of his 
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creed) underwhelmed with the causal connections of the material world that form the 
content of empirical knowledge: if God wills, the “laws” of physics may be broken at any 
instant, as they are nothing more than ʿādāt, or correlations He tends to create in the 
physical world as a part of His sunna.251 Empirical knowledge takes these rather shaky 
correlations as its foundation, thus it has limited functionality in the Islamic worldview. 
Moreover, this branch can never be a source of knowledge of the hereafter or of any 
metaphysical reality; such a thing could only be achieved if “some of the dead were to 
return to us and apprise us of those beneficial, accepted deeds that bring us to a station of 
proximity to God, and of those [deeds] that distance us from Him, and also about the 
dictates of faith.”252 Interestingly, both modern physicalists and the pagan Arabs in the 
time of the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص (rather impertinently) challenge those who believe in life after 
death to produce evidence of this kind.253 While they wait for this, they might consider 
that, from the perspective of Islamic epistemology, apodeictic proofs (based on pure 
reason) are stronger than empirical proofs in the human attempts to reach theoretical 
conclusions about metaphysical realities.  
To Imām al-Ghazālī, the material sciences have an important role to play in 
improving man’s material life on earth,254 but should not and cannot venture beyond this 
into the realm of metaphysical truths. This is because they are necessarily limited to 
knowledge about one half of a thing’s existence: its physical existence, never its 
existence in the spiritual realm.255 Moreover, they are subject to and checked by the 
power of reason.256 He does admit that empirical knowledge can be more easily 
established in the heart due to its immediacy and relative ease of verifiability, opining 
that “the theologian who has acquired knowledge from books and oral transmissions 
would most likely deny this and not call his own soul to account over the disparate states 
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it encounters.”257 This, however, is relative to the intellect’s affirmation of revealed 
truths; knowledge of the kind Imām al-Ghazālī is (quietly) most interested in - 
experiential knowledge of the hidden realities behind creation - blows the kind of 
certainty acquired through empirical verification or reasoned proof out of the water, so to 
speak.258 The degrees of certitude acquired through these different sources (intellectual 
and revealed) give us the basis for yet another framework describing knowledge set out 
by Imām al-Ghazālī: “Ascertainment by apodeictic proof leads to knowledge (ʿilm). 
Intimate experience of that very state is fruitional experience (dhawq). Favorable 
acceptance of it based on hearsay and experiences of others is faith (īmān). These, then, 
are three degrees, or levels, of knowledge - ‘God raises in degrees those of you who 
believe and those to whom knowledge is given.’”259   
4.3.4.   Angels as Messengers that Deliver Knowledge to the Heart 
If we transition to the revelatory side of our tree of knowledge, one of its branches 
- a secondary cause that God employs to teach mankind - is the use of angels to deliver 
knowledge to the heart.260 These otherworldly creatures are a part of God’s creation just 
as humans are, but unlike humans, they are not capable of disobeying God and act 
exclusively in His service.261 Note that belief in the angels is one of the necessary 
elements of Islamic creed;262 their multifarious roles are described in numerous places 
throughout the Qur’ān.263 One of these is that they are a means by which God inspires the 
hearts and, in formal prophecy, sends the message of His words to the prophets, since “it 
is not God’s wont to speak [directly] to a human being, unless by inspiration or from 
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behind a veil, or by the sending of a messenger.”264 Sometimes the mode of this form of 
revelation is physical and involves “hearing a distinct voice through the auditory sense of 
the ear, or witnessing an angel by means of actual eyesight.”265 This mode of revelation is 
an interesting example of the blurring of the line dividing the metaphysical and the 
physical in Islamic thought.  
In a more abstract description of the same phenomenon, Imām al-Ghazālī writes 
that God “casts the light of knowledge into the heart by means of the angels,” who “make 
their abodes, with the treasures of God’s mercy that they possess, only in the hearts of the 
virtuous and pure.”266 We have mentioned that the seat of knowledge, the heart, though 
metaphysical, is subtly connected to the physical heart. Here, Imām al-Ghazālī describes 
the heart using spatial terms, further obscuring the distinction between the corporeal and 
spiritual realms.267 Each human heart is like a house - a space into which the angels might 
descend - if it is purified of the negative qualities that are “like barking dogs,” and which 
distance those subtle creatures from the heart they might otherwise occupy.268 The angels 
are beings pure of sin, and are liable to be repulsed by moral, spiritual ugliness. In this 
way, as we will see in the next chapter, the ethical project of purifying one’s heart of 
corruption and vice opens up the channels to revealed, experiential knowledge. The role 
of angels in Imām al-Ghazālī’s theory of knowledge is a good example of a mode of 
knowledge acquisition that would be utterly nonsensical from a materialist’s point of 
view, but angels have a place and their own proper roles within Imām al-Ghazālī’s larger 
cosmology, thus it is not irrational for him to point out the function they play in relation 
to knowledge and learning. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  
HOW TO DERIVE KNOWLEDGE FROM ITS SOURCES 
Even under the view of causality held by Imām al-Ghazālī and within the ’Ashʿarī 
school of theology, action is taken with the expectation that causes are associated with 
and usually lead to certain effects taking place.269 Thus, the fact that God is the primary 
cause of knowledge entering the heart does not free the student from the obligation of 
seeking knowledge out through the secondary causes God creates. We have spoken about 
the trunk of the tree representing the sources of knowledge, its two main branches, reason 
and revelation, and the smaller branches that these, in turn, break off into, representing 
tertiary sources of knowledge. At the risk of overextending our metaphor, we may call 
the actual content of knowledge the fruit of this tree. Then, the means by which we derive 
knowledge from its sources could be described as the flowering buds that grow from the 
branches of the tree.  In this chapter, we will be exploring means of deriving knowledge 
from its sources in Imām al-Ghazālī’s theory of knowledge, some of which would be 
decried as being prelogical or irrational by modern thinkers in the field of epistemology 
and beyond. 
5.1.   Knowledge is Gained by Maintaining the Proper Intentions 
5.1.1.   Flawed Intentionality Prevents One from Gaining Knowledge 
The ultimate valuation of any act in the Islamic worldview is determined by the 
intentions that prompt and motivate it,270 and the act of seeking knowledge is no 
exception to this rule. In Imām al-Ghazālī’s theory of knowledge, correct intention 
impacts knowledge acquisition on several fronts. The first of these is the question of 
whether one can gain true knowledge with corrupt intentions. On this point, Imām al-
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Ghazālī quotes Yaḥyā b. Muʿādh al-Rāzī, who is reported to have said: “Verily the 
brilliance of knowledge and wisdom depart when worldly gain is sought through 
them.”271 Under Imām al-Ghazālī’s  worldview, true knowledge is knowledge of God, for 
the sake of God; knowledge used as a means to anything other than God is a sign of a 
flawed understanding of reality. To make worldly gain the intention behind one’s quest 
on path of knowledge is to fail to recognize the most basic precept of that path: that this 
world and the next are diametrically opposed, that the latter is to be sought out over the 
former, and that when you seek one you lose the other.272 Anyone who “has not come to 
realize the paltriness of this world, its squalid murkiness, and the way its pleasure is 
mixed with pain, wherein anything of goodness eventually passes away, [he] lacks even 
minimal insight.”273 This is something any human might come to know experientially, 
whatever the content of their beliefs. A believing Muslim bears a further piece of 
knowledge, one that alters his or her entire approach to life: that the life of the hereafter is 
everlasting and that bartering this life for it secures the eternal reward of paradise.274 In a 
metaphysic that takes this to be a basic fact, seeking out the former at the expense of the 
latter is folly - such an intention, though all too common, runs counter to knowledge, thus 
cannot lead to knowledge. There is a saying that is commonly quoted in relation to the 
topic of intentionality in seeking knowledge: “We pursued knowledge for other than God, 
but knowledge refused to be for other than God alone.” Imām al-Ghazālī explains that the 
meaning of this statement “is that knowledge refused and rejected us and did not reveal 
its true character to us; all we gained access to was its formal discourse and words.”275 
True knowledge cannot be gained without the proper intentions. Thus, in order to gain 
knowledge, one must constantly adjust one’s intention, calibrating it to true north: that is, 
orienting it towards the life of the hereafter and the pursuit of the pleasure of God, rather 
than the material or social gains of this life, such as wealth, status, or power.276 It is one 
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of the core responsibilities of the student to be doing this at all times; that student 
eventually becomes the scholar that is the backbone of society’s spiritual life.277 
Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the knowledgeable teacher to admonish his or her 
students if he or she suspects they are somehow lacking in this respect.278 
5.1.2.   Flawed Intentionality Leads to the Removal of Knowledge from the World 
Another impact of flawed intentions is to contribute to the eventual removal of 
knowledge from the world:  
“Ibn Masʿūd said, ‘A time will come to people in which...knowledge will benefit neither the 
scholar nor his pupil...This occurs when the hearts of the scholars bend toward the love of the 
world and prefer it over the hereafter; that is the time in which God divests them of the founts 
of wisdom [that had resided therein] and He extinguishes the lamps of guidance from their 
hearts. When you encounter a scholar [of those times] he will inform you on his tongue that 
he is in awe of God, yet impiety is clear in his comportment. How fertile are the tongues in 
those days and how barren are the hearts!’”279  
 
There is much in Imām al-Ghazālī’s works decrying the state of intellectual life in his 
time,280 as well as many narrations warning about the deterioration that was prophesied to 
come at the end of times.281 We have said that knowledge is preserved by the scholars, 
whose corruption leads directly to the corruption of knowledge. The measure of 
corruption in the scholars - the criteria mentioned by Imām al-Ghazālī most often in 
conjunction with scholarly corruption - is intention.282 When the scholars use knowledge 
for their own worldly benefit, they turn people away from the truth, ruin the health of the 
society, and contribute to the ultimate erosion of knowledge. It is, however, especially 
difficult for scholars to guard their intentions, because their position is one of spiritual 
authority in the community. Authority is power and power is a force of corruption for 
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mankind, but spiritual authority is more potent and tempting than any other kind of 
power.283 For this reason, Sufyān al-Thawrī said: “The temptation of narrating ḥadīth is 
more perilous than the temptation of kin, wealth, or sons; how can one not fear its perils 
when it was said to the most eminent of the messengers [of God] ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, And if we had not 
strengthened you, you would have almost inclined to them a little [17:74].”284 If the 
Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص himself would have inclined under the weight of power if it were not for the 
protection of God, the fallible scholars are likely to be completely crushed by it. Their 
role is crucial, and if they succumb, they risk great punishment.285 
5.1.3.   Flawed Intentionality Causes One’s Knowledge to Count Against One 
A third impact of flawed intentionality in seeking knowledge is that one’s actions, 
judged insincere, are unlikely to be accepted by God. Imām al-Ghazālī cautions his 
readers to avoid the delusion that “God accepts any knowledge or action that was not 
accomplished sincerely for His countenance alone.”286 This is crucial, because Imām al-
Ghazālī takes much of knowledge to be a means to approach God (and the rest of it to be 
knowledge of God itself), but to seek worldly rank through knowledge is to try and 
approach Him by means of what He despises.287 Seeking knowledge is almost never a 
neutral act: is has an effect on the person seeking it, either working in his or her favor by 
securing paradise or working against him or her by engendering the wrath of God and 
punishment in the hereafter.288 The use of religious knowledge to gain worldly benefit in 
particular barrs one from even catching the scent of paradise.289 Imām al-Ghazālī has a 
good deal of personal experience with the question of intention: it was largely what 
brought about his legendary personal crisis and subsequent departure from the 
Niẓāmiyya. He writes in his autobiography:  
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“I reflected on my intention in my public teaching, and I saw that it was not directed purely to 
God, but rather was instigated and motivated by the quest for fame and widespread prestige. 
So I became certain that I was on the brink of a crumbling bank and already on the verge of 
falling into the Fire, unless I set about mending my ways.”290   
 
His path in pursuit of knowledge taught him that “learning with the intention of this 
world only is devastation and devastating.”291 Interestingly enough, when a believer 
adjusts his or her intention and leaves off chasing this world, God’s grants it to him or her 
with ease and protects him or her from falling into worldly need.292 The pursuit of 
knowledge is then sanctified; any knowledge gained with correct intention, rather than 
acting as a proof against its bearer, acts as a witness for him or her.293  
5.2.   Knowledge is Gained through Study and Reflection 
5.2.1.   Asking Questions 
The intellect, which is key in helping identify the truth, is a central source of 
knowledge and the means of deriving that knowledge from it include all the obvious 
mental processes related to learning, like asking questions, reflection, and study. Given 
that man is not born a scholar, knowledge must be attained through learning.294 The 
Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said regarding that that “Knowledge is similar to sealed storerooms, the keys 
to which are inquiry, so ask [and seek to know]; four [types of people] will be rewarded: 
the one who asks, the scholar [who responds], the one listening, and the one who loves all 
of them.”295 This was his own practice with his Companions; Anas b. Malik described the 
gatherings that the Prophet loved so well, those in which God was remembered, saying 
“we used to sit discussing belief, pondering [the meanings of] the Qur’ān, learning 
discernment in the science of the religion, and counting the graces that God had bestowed 
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upon us.”296 Discussion, questioning, active thought - where these are absent, knowledge 
is rare. Imām al-Ghazālī describes the path of seeking knowledge as one of reflection, 
through which one understands the nature of the world.297 If asking questions were 
forbidden, God would not have commanded the believers to do so in the verses we have 
cited previously, [16:43] and [21:7].298 If one is fortunate enough to have found a true 
scholar to learn from, that scholar will be cautious and wise in answering it, for such a 
person is one “who, when asked a question, dreads that he will be asked [about it] on the 
day of judgment, ‘From where did you answer?”299 Under the wing of a good teacher, a 
respectful student may ask freely and by establishing “the intimate discourse that was an 
integral facet of the teacher/student relationship in the Islamic sciences,”300 he or she will 
be sure to learn. 
5.2.2.   Debate and its Many Dangers 
The discourse between a student and his or her teacher, as well as discourse 
between students or between scholars will often escalate from questioning to back-and-
forth debate. Indeed, public debates were a huge part of the intellectual culture of Imām 
al-Ghazālī’s time.301 This is part of learning and is necessary to the extent that the goal 
“is inquiry into the truth of a matter in order to render it clear and evident, for truth is 
worth seeking.”302 What’s more, “mutual support when regarding knowledge and sharing 
ideas is beneficial and effective,” and it was the wont of the Companions to debate issues 
in their consultations.303 However, Imām al-Ghazālī argues across various works that the 
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dangers of debate outweigh it benefits and, in light of this, he sets eight conditions for 
anyone who wishes to avoid spiritual harm in participating in them.304  
The significance that this bears for our discussion is that the conditions Imām al-
Ghazālī lists are not purely intellectual: most of them deal with the sincerity and intention 
of the person considering debate. It is an example of spiritual ethics overriding a method 
that modern common sense would take to be an excellent way to learn. In Islamic 
thought, however, seeking out debate can be a sign of spiritual illness, as is indicated in 
the verse: “As for those in whose hearts is deviation [from truth], they will follow that of 
it which is unspecific, seeking discord and seeking an interpretation [suitable to them]. 
And no one knows its [true] interpretation except God.”305 Argumentation for its own 
sake cannot be a trait of the true scholar, for the quality that often motivates those seeking 
out debate is attraction to ostentation, fame, and rank.306 It gives rise to serious moral 
flaws and weakness of character.307 Perhaps this is why the great legal scholar, Imām 
Mālik ibn Anas, is reported to have said that there is no room for dialectics in religion.308 
This holds even when one is certain that one’s own view is the correct one, for the 
Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص himself encouraged his followers to avoid disputation, saying that “Whoever 
ceases disputing a matter in which he is in the wrong, God will build him a residence in 
the meadows of heaven; and whoever ceases disputing a matter in which he is in the 
right, God will build a residence in the highest heaven.”309 Restraining oneself from 
excess argumentation can thus be deemed a principle of Islamic intellectual ethics, a 
quality that God loves, and whose opposite He detests.310  
Though much of Imām al-Ghazālī’s various diatribes on this topic are justified on 
the basis of ethical ideas, he also does not recommend seeking the truth through 
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argumentation on practical grounds. He believes that debate is not an effective means of 
convincing the hearts. This is because “heated debate and zealotry...strengthens the 
motivations for going astray and excites the causes for extremism and obstinacy.”311 He 
believes that people are liable to hold on to their own views when those views are being 
wrested from their hands forcefully; even if they are defeated in the debate, they will 
rationalize this in a way that allows them to maintain their beliefs.312 The only way to 
avoid this is to counsel with gentleness313 and debate with humility.314 In this, the model 
to be followed is set by another of the great legal scholars, Imām Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-
Shāfiʿī, who said: “I have never spoken to anyone without wishing that God would grant 
him success, guidance, support, care, and protection. And I have never spoken with 
anyone while caring whether God clarified the truth through my words or his.”315 In this 
way, the practical and the ethical are joined; under Imām al-Ghazālī’s understanding of 
debate, human behavior is weighed holistically such that no part of human nature is 
ignored in deriving the educational principles employed here.   
5.2.3.   Beginning Study with What is Easily Understood 
A practical consideration that Imām al-Ghazālī emphasizes is that students should 
make use of the proper classification of the sciences in order to direct their curricula, such 
that they begin their study with what is a prerequisite to further knowledge and work their 
way up systematically through the other disciplines. The student ought to treat his life’s 
work as a ladder, gaining a solid foothold at each level before moving up to next.316 
Imām al-Ghazālī names this amongst the responsibilities of the student, saying that they 
should limit their study to certain fields until they have achieved a solid foundation, then 
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move on to the others, rather than trying to master them all at once.317 A wise student will 
“not pass beyond an area of study until they are well grounded in it theoretically and 
practically.”318 
It is the teacher’s responsibility to guide the student in this, as in all matters of 
learning; he does so by limiting “the student [to the material that is] at the level of his 
comprehension. He therefore does not convey to [the student] that which his intellect has 
no means of accessing or that which would overcome it and create in him an aversion to 
its pursuit.”319 This protects the student from confusion and distraction, essentially 
removing barriers from his or her path of study. The teachings of a scholar are catered to 
his or her audience; he or she does not bring paradoxes or obscurities to the attention of 
the neophyte.320 For the student, hearing divergent opinions or dealing with subtle 
nuances at early stages “bewilders his reason...and perplexes his mind; it diminishes his 
judgment and causes him to despair of ever attaining comprehension and awareness.”321 
It is a part of human nature that the mind be overwhelmed by what is beyond its grasp; 
for this reason, the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص is reported to have said: “No one speaks to a people on a 
matter that their intellects cannot grasp without that causing trial and tribulation among 
some of them.”322 The skilled teacher knows this, and prevents the student from getting 
too far out of his or her depth, holding them instead to certain prescribed curricula.323 
This recommendation, my reader will note, reveals a very commonsense understanding 
of education; Imām al-Ghazālī’s theory of knowledge does not lack such practical 
considerations. However, this means is not more efficacious than the spiritual or physical 
means we will come to in this chapter. Furthermore, Imām al-Ghazālī  does not draw any 
apparent distinction between them or group them into different chapters on the basis of 
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their relative rationality, as Von Grunebaum seems to think Muslim scholars writing on 
education do.324 
5.2.4.   Avoiding Distraction 
A point less belaboured by Imām al-Ghazālī, but equally useful for students to 
bear in mind in organizing their daily life, is that they should be careful to avoid 
distractions. If one is distracted in seeking knowledge, one will not be able to grasp the 
subtle realities behind external knowledge.325 Moreover, distractions lead to a waste of 
one’s mental resources, which, like a river, when spread over too wide a space, loses 
depth - some of it being absorbed, some of it evaporating, until its flow is no longer 
strong enough to make proper use of.326 In order for a student to use his resources most 
efficiently, he must hone them to a fine point. Thus it is the responsibility of students to 
free themselves from excess responsibilities and occupations unrelated to knowledge 
seeking, for such work will distract them from their greater mission. Imām al-Ghazālī 
goes as far as to suggest that they move away from their families and homelands in 
seeking knowledge so that they might reduce distraction, since “ties and relationships are 
things that preoccupy one and distract him from his goal.”327 If this recommendation 
seems a bit heartless, the label is not so far off: Imām al-Ghazālī follows it immediately 
with verse [33:4] from the Qur’ān, “God has not created for a man two hearts in his 
breast,” implying that love of knowledge has to take precedence over love of one’s 
family - one cannot maintain an equal commitment to both. Given the great significance 
of knowledge in Islam and the reverence afforded to it, such sacrifices are deemed 
worthwhile - after all, the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص was reported to have said to his community: “Seek 
knowledge even in China,” which, in his time, implied “even unto the ends of the 
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earth.”328 Thus Imām al-Ghazālī’s rhetoric, while it may seem extreme to the modern 
consciousness, is actually quite normal within Islamic educational thought.  
5.3.   Knowledge is Gained Through Righteousness and Good Character  
5.3.1.   Ethics as a Means of Knowledge Acquisition 
We have seen throughout the thesis that the philosophical realms of epistemology 
and ethics are inextricably linked in the Islamic worldview; Imām al-Ghazālī uses this 
fact to motivate and structure his ideas about education, then leverages the resulting 
pedagogy into a massive project of revival. It was “perhaps one of his principal 
contributions to the synthesis of the mystic and orthodox approaches in Islam” that he 
“presents the two ways in which religious truths can be acquired - the scholarly and the 
ethical - as ways that combine.”329 The idea that ethical behavior guided by knowledge 
causes an increase in one’s knowledge was not Imām al-Ghazālī’s, however: its nature as 
a principle of Islamic thought is attested to by the ḥadīth in which the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said, 
“Whoever implements his acquired knowledge, God will make [him] an heir to 
knowledge not known to him.”330 Thus, acting in accordance with religious knowledge 
(which constitutes, in Islam, the content of ethics) is a means of obtaining further 
knowledge through the grace of God.  
This kind of knowledge cannot be gained through anything but God’s mercy and 
striving on the straight path: it is experiential or spiritual knowledge, the part of 
revelation called “inspiration” or “unveiling.”331 Imām al-Ghazālī considers it to be the 
highest form of knowledge,332 and writes that it cannot effectively be sought through 
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“texts and formal education, [for] these do not suffice in that [unveiling].”333 Only by 
striving to live ethically, working in God’s cause to gain His love, can a student 
understand the subtleties workings of his heart - the center of his moral and conscious 
being - and, in understanding, polish it to the point where it may reflect the underlying 
meanings of God’s creation. In relation to this, Imām al-Ghazālī cites the famous ḥadīth 
qudsī that forms the basis of much of the science of taṣawwuf, in which the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص 
relates the words of God: “My servant continues to draw near to me with supererogatory 
acts [of worship] until I love him. When I love him, I am his hearing with which he hears, 
and his sight with which he sees, and his hand with which he strikes, and his foot with 
which he walks.”334 Again, using every action, every moment, to earn the pleasure of 
God in accordance with the content of religious knowledge opens up the channels of His 
divine inspiration. Taṣawwuf is a discipline that sets out the processes of inner or spiritual 
purification (tazkiyya) by which this might be achieved. It is “an unfathomable ocean into 
which every seeker plunges to the capacity of what has been provided for him, and in 
accordance with the worthy acts he has been destined to achieve.”335 
5.3.2.   Spiritual Purification as a Means of Knowledge Acquisition 
In Chapter Three we introduced the concept of experiential knowledge, as far as it 
is discussed openly in Imām al-Ghazālī’s works; now we will approach this form of 
knowledge from the perspective of its acquisition. The means of achieving spiritual 
knowledge naturally involve the soul or the heart itself: cleansing the mirror of the heart 
“from the impurities that make up the veil [between us] and God most High and [prevent 
our] realization of His attributes and acts.”336 In this way, one allows for the light of the 
knowledge of God and His guidance to be reflected in it. Purification is pursued 
throughout one’s worldly life by joining one’s intellectual work on the path of knowledge 
with spiritual work; when one does this, one can acquire the full spectrum of beneficial 
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knowledge, both the knowledge of conduct and the knowledge of unveiling. The act of 
purification the heart involves removing the “reprehensible character traits and 
blameworthy qualities”337 that it bears, fighting the base desires of the appetitive soul the 
(nafs) and following the examples of the prophets to adorn the heart with virtuous and 
beautiful traits.338 Imām al-Ghazālī describes the spiritual path in his Deliverance from 
Error:  
“the first of its requirements...is the total purification of the heart from everything other than 
God Most High. Its key...is the utter absorption of the heart in the remembrance of God. Its 
end is being completely lost in God”339 
 
The highest form of knowledge is best achieved through these means, not through the 
external sciences alone.340 The true scholars, then, are those who pair their pursuit of 
knowledge of the external sciences with pursuit of spiritual excellence, watching over the 
states of their hearts as assiduously as they scrutinize any intellectual problem. If they are 
“steadfast in practice and contemplation of the heart,” God reveals to them “the subtleties 
of wisdom that would confound the intellects of [even] those bestowed with 
perception.”341 Their work serves to slowly pry open the doors to inspiration found in the 
heart.  
When one sets out on this path in earnest, “revelations and visions begin, so that, 
even when awake, the Sufis see the angels and the spirits of the prophets and hear voices 
coming from them and learn useful things from them. Then their ‘state’ ascends from the 
vision of forms and likenesses to stages beyond the narrow range of words.”342 As we 
have mentioned before, very little of this learning process can be expressed verbally: its 
reality and the subtleties of its nature can only be learned as such knowledge itself is 
achieved - that is, experientially. Nevertheless, the theories found within the science of 
taṣawwuf can give the neophyte a basic enough understanding that he or she may pursue 
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such knowledge; Imām al-Ghazālī explains that “one to whom such experience is not 
granted can acquire certain knowledge of that state through...hearsay,”343 by keeping the 
company of the spiritual masters, which will lead to faith in the efficacy of their 
practices, not to mention the general moral benefit that may be gained by a person 
observing their lifestyle and imbibing their worldview. If one is not lucky enough to be in 
the company of such people, one “must learn the certain possibility of such mystical 
states through the evidence of apodeictic demonstration in the way we have mentioned in 
‘The Book of the Marvels of the Heart.’”344 Another element that puts spiritual 
purification out of the reach of the intellect alone is that its specific teachings are sourced 
from revealed knowledge, whether inspired or prophetic, about metaphysical realities 
beyond the perception of the external senses. This does not affect the efficacy of the 
means involved in seeking knowledge from this branch, since, as Imām al-Ghazālī argues 
extensively, metaphysical realities have their own variegated properties just as physical 
phenomena do - “very stupid and ignorant would be the man who...would suppose that 
they had been mentioned by chance, and not because of a profound divine significance in 
them which requires them to be such because of the special property in them.”345 Like 
“the reason for the effectiveness of the remedies of the acts of worship, with their 
prescriptions and determined quantities ordained by the prophets,” these “cannot be 
perceived by means of the intellectual resources of men endowed with intellect” but 
“must be the object of blind obedience to the prophets who perceived those qualities by 
the light of prophecy.”346 The blind obedience Imām al-Ghazālī mentions here is granted 
to the prophets in particular, as we saw in Chapter Four when discussing rightful 
authority in Islam. He maintains the practice of the orthodoxy with relation to Sufism: 
that is, subjecting it always to the tenets of the law. Thus, study of the external sciences 
(including jurisprudence), though it has its limits in terms of what kind of knowledge it 
can bring one, is a necessary condition of being successful on the path to the hereafter. 
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Imām al-Ghazālī cautions that “one who acquires ḥadīth and knowledge, then takes the 
Sufi path will succeed; while one who takes the Sufi path before acquiring knowledge is 
gambling with his soul.”347 Thus, the assertion of some that his “Sufi side” was distinct 
from his praxis is misleading. As Mayer incisively points out, “it is simply false that the 
gnostic vortex of Ghazālī’s worldview bears no relation to its ethical base, as if bracketed 
off in a purely separate sphere of understanding.”348  
Imām al-Ghazālī focuses heavily on spiritual purification in describing the path of 
knowledge acquisition; it is a central part of his project of reviving the spiritual life of his 
religious community - a mission was born of his own experiences. Imām al-Ghazālī is a 
guide on the path he describes in his works: though further along than those he seeks to 
teach, his ultimate goal, if we may take his word for it, is the same as the one he 
recommends others aim towards. This motivates his life’s work and lends a note of 
sincerity to his views - to what are so very clearly his own beliefs. At the end of 
Deliverance from Error, his text of intellectual self-reflection, he writes:  
“I now earnestly desire to reform myself and others, but I do not know whether I shall attain 
my desire or be cut off by death short of my goal...I ask Him, then, to reform me first, then to 
use me as an instrument of reform; to guide me, then to use me as an instrument of guidance; 
to show me the true as true, and to grant me the grace to follow it; and to show me the false as 
false, and to grant me the grace to eschew it!”349  
 
In this way, he actively avails himself (while writing) of means that would be prelogical 
in the minds of modern secular thinkers. Throughout this autobiographical text, the reader 
can see that the means he recommends for students seeking knowledge elsewhere in his 
works are the ones he himself used to reform his own soul when he saw it to be in danger. 
Spiritual purification is the foremost of these and its metaphysical implications cannot be 
written off as being mere folkways he simply accepts for the sake of religious 
consistency350 - nor should they be overlooked by arguing that “Al-Ghazālī excels [fellow 
scholar] az-Zarnūjī by eliminating all prelogical matter and by closer coordination of 
                                                
347 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” 83. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 56. 
348 Mayer, Introduction to Letter to a Disciple, xxvii. 
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moral principle, scientific outlook, and instructional technique.”351 Many of the means 
Von Grunebaum labels as prelogical in Imām Burhān al-Dīn al-Zarnūjī’s work, 
Instruction of the Student: The Method of Learning, feature in Imām al-Ghazālī’s 
educational thought as well. 
5.3.3.   Knowledge is Gained Through Reverence for Knowledge  
We have spoken of the nobility of knowledge in Islamic thought: how, as blessed 
as the generality of believing Muslims are, “the scholars are superior to the believers by 
seven hundred levels” such that “between each level is a journey of five hundred 
years,”352 and how the scholars are the heirs of the greatest of mankind, the prophets.353 
Since knowledge is nobility, and nobility commands reverence, it is a duty of the student 
to conduct himself with respect and reverence towards knowledge and towards anyone 
who possesses or is even associated with it. All the other beings in creation revere the 
knowledgeable guides amongst mankind: as the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص related, “Indeed, God, His 
angels, those who dwell in the heavens and the earth, even the ant in its hill and the fish 
in the ocean, all bless the one who teaches the people the path to beneficence.”354 Should 
not the students of such people be the foremost to take the pains to do so?  
The reverence of the seekers of knowledge arises from love of knowledge, which 
is in turn born of love of God, Who is the ultimate aim of the seekers. For this reason, 
Imām ʿAlī said “Love of knowledge is a religion by which one lives.”355 Sincere students 
will feel this love naturally and will act in accordance with it, for if the student loves 
knowledge, he will love and respect those that lead him to it. We have said previously 
that mankind is in need of a guide on the path of seeking knowledge, someone “to refine 
him and show him the way to God the Exalted,”356 but finding someone who is fit for this 
is very difficult, as such men are rare indeed. Thus, “whoever is favored by good fortune 
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in finding a master such as we have mentioned, and the master accepts him, should 
venerate him outwardly and inwardly.”357 The object of the student’s quest is knowledge, 
so, if he is not an ingrate, “he adorns with a necklace of gratitude whoever leads him to 
it.”358 One owes the teachers of the religious sciences in particular a debt equal or greater 
than the debt owed to one’s parents, for one’s parents protect one in this worldly life, but 
one’s teachers protect one in the next.359 Elaborating on this idea, Imām al-Ghazālī 
writes,  
“For that reason the teacher’s responsibility is more grave than that of the parents; for though 
the father is the primary cause of the child’s present existence and his ephemeral life, the 
teacher is the primary cause behind his immortal life. Were it not for the teacher, the student 
would eventually divert that which his father had rendered unto him into everlasting 
annihilation; whereas from the teacher he derives the benefit of everlasting life in the abode 
of the hereafter.”360 
 
If reverence toward knowledge and teachers seems an excessive and unfamiliar concept 
to the modern thinker, it is likely because this tie between education and the hereafter has 
been broken. In Islam, however, the connection remains, such that these concepts are 
active in governing Islamic circles of knowledge today just as they had centuries ago. 
Again, through educational themes, we find that the holistic understanding of reality 
found in Islam creates an overlap between cosmology, ethics, and epistemology.  
How exactly does one act with reverence towards knowledge and those who 
possess it? There is much that falls into the category of reverence, but its cornerstones are 
humility, etiquette, restraint, and service.361 One ought not to question the scholar 
excessively, nor insist on a response if he or she does not provide one, nor harangue him 
or her in any way.362 One makes excuses for him or her if he or she seems to falter, and 
one does not enter into debate to prove him or her wrong on a matter even if one is aware 
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of a mistake he or she has made.363 Inwardly, one should think of teachers as one treats 
them, not allowing an inconsistency to arise between one’s outward and inward reverence 
for them, lest one fall into hypocrisy.364 If one is having trouble doing this with a 
particular teacher, one should leave his or her presence until and unless one is able to 
achieve an internal and external uniformity of opinion.365 One should always be at the 
service of one’s teachers; one should strive to be the first to rise if one’s teacher is in need 
of anything and should work hard to achieve whatever tasks the teacher sets one.366 
Under no circumstances should the student evince (nor allow for the existence) of any 
arrogance or impudence towards either the teacher or the knowledge he or she is setting 
forward.367 Part of this is accepting, with humility, true knowledge even from those 
teachers that are not notable or famous.368 All of this would be very difficult if the path of 
seeking knowledge was not the path of righteousness; if it did not require the cultivation 
of the highest moral character and decency. Education in our times, in most cases, does 
involve the same degree of cultivation, nor would it take reverence to be a requirement of 
learning. To limit the ability of a student to question his or her teacher, for example, 
would be seen as counterproductive. But in Islamic thought, etiquette or right conduct 
(adab) is one of the subtle means by which one attains knowledge; the ideas are so 
intertwined that the words for education and etiquette share the same linguistic roots.369 
The burden of reverence does not fall squarely on the shoulders of the student: the 
teacher has reciprocal responsibilities toward the student that help the student achieve the 
moral heights he or she should aspire to. The teacher should not view students as being 
indebted to him or her (though students are indebted to their teachers), but should see 
them as noble people and respect their efforts, for “they have made the goal of their 
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hearts the intimate proximity to God by sowing knowledge therein.”370 They should not 
take advantage of the position of authority they bear, using the reverence of the student 
against him or her for worldly gain. Corrupt scholars fail to pass this benchmark of 
sincere intentions in teaching: they “expect the student to sustain the teacher at every turn 
of fate, to come to the aid of [the teacher’s] supporters and treat his enemies with 
animosity, and be like the donkey for all his requirements, be subservient before him, and 
fulfill his requests.”371 Imām al-Ghazālī warns students to watch out for and assiduously 
avoid these so-called scholars, providing extensive descriptions thereof so that they might 
“recognize the degrees of subtle deceptions.”372 The danger the corrupt scholar poses to 
the society cannot be overstated: such a person “is a ghoul, a demon who sweeps men off 
the path and destroys them, and they must run from him, since…[he] will wreak havoc on 
their religion the like of which Satan himself cannot.”373 Thus the scholar should take 
care to guard his or her intentions and actions as much as, if not more than, the student. 
He or she should facilitate the reverence of the student by guiding the student with 
kindness and mercy, not explicit criticism, which “rips aside the veil of 
reverence...unleashes a response of arrogant self-defense and only provokes an increased 
desire to persevere [in error].”374 Moreover, the scholar should live out the content of his 
or her teachings, displaying the same respect towards knowledge that is demanded of the 
student; this includes respecting fields of knowledge outside of their own specialty.375 
The true scholars of the past were able to maintain these standards. Imām Mālik, for 
example, famously  
“held the Islamic disciplines (ʿilm al-dīn) in such high esteem that when he intended to 
narrate ḥadīth he would make his ablutions, then sit on the front edge of his low dais, comb 
out his beard and apply perfume, [then] settle into a sitting position, and with dignity and 
solemnity he would narrate ḥadīth. When asked about that, he responded, ‘Upholding the 
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exaltedness of the ḥadīth of the Messenger of God ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص is very dear to me’...this reverence and 
solemnity point to the strength of his realization of the sublime nature of God most high.”376 
 
Imām Mālik’s reverence for knowledge is held up as a model for seekers of knowledge 
even today. His great contributions to the intellectual history of Islam would not have 
been achieved to the same extent without the dutiful respect and love that this narration 
describes.  
5.3.4.   Knowledge is gained through Humility 
One of the most important qualities sought through spiritual purification - one 
which facilitates reverence for knowledge and many other aspects of ethical life in the 
Islamic worldview - is humility. I mention humility (just one of the many virtuous 
qualities Imām al-Ghazālī  writes of) because it, like reverence, has a specific 
significance when it comes to the acquisition of knowledge. One of the reasons for this is 
that the arrogance is a barrier to learning. In order to learn one must always maintain a 
humble consciousness of one’s own relative ignorance; then, one is able to take 
“everything that is cast before him by listening attentively, with humility, gratitude, joy, 
and gracious acceptance.”377 Only then can one recognize, as Imām ʿAlī does when 
proven wrong by a man asking him a question, “You are right and I am wrong; above 
every possessor of knowledge is one [more] knowing.”378 Those who have established 
proper intentions in seeking knowledge, who put the truth above everything, including 
their own image, are able to admit their own ignorance and mistakes and, in doing so, 
learn.379 The greatest scholars of the Islamic intellectual tradition possessed this crucial 
quality; Imām al-Shāfiʿī said of his teacher Imām Mālik, “I witnessed Mālik being 
questioned on forty-eight matters, he responded to thirty-two of them with, ‘I do not 
know.’”380 The Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص himself was humble enough to say the same:  
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“When the Messenger of God ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص was questioned about the most worthy and most evil places 
on the earth he responded, ‘I do not know,’ and even when Gabriel questioned him about 
them he responded, ‘I do not know.’ Then God taught him that the most worthy place was the 
mosque and the most evil were the market places.”381  
 
As the ultimate model for Muslims to emulate, the Prophet here sets an important 
precedent, demonstrating the necessity of humility even amongst those who possess the 
greatest authority and power in a community. Humility serves to protect everyone who 
attains it, no matter their position in the society, but it is a crucial prerequisite for the 
scholar. It is for this reason that Ibn Masʿūd said: “The scholar’s shield is ‘I do not 
know,’ if he errs in its use, his vital organs will be struck.”382  
Paradoxically, humility is the only means of truly raising oneself - when seeking 
knowledge and in every other realm of life. This is because, in the cross-section of 
Islamic ethics and theology, it is taught that God loves humility in His creation and hates 
for them to display even the smallest trace of arrogance.383 Exaltation is His right and His 
right alone; His creation is utterly in need of Him and must reflect this through humility 
before Him. Thus, as the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said, “Whoever acts with arrogance, God will bring 
low; and whoever is humble, God will raise up.”384 Humility is a quality of beauty in 
mankind; it is “the finest garment God confers on a servant,” and is the “raiment of the 
prophets, and the outward traits of the righteous, the veracious, and the true scholars.”385 
While some might manipulate the Islamic teaching that humiliation does not befit the 
believer in order to justify their own arrogance, there is a difference between humiliation 
and humility.386 The wise will be able to make the distinction and display the right quality 
in any given situation; they will also know that they should err on the side of humility, 
especially if they want remain open to learning at all times.  
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5.4.  Knowledge is Gained by Regulating the Physical Body 
5.4.1.   The Significance of the Body  
We have discussed, throughout the thesis, the means by which the soul is 
illuminated with knowledge. This focus was not unjustified: in Imām al-Ghazālī’s 
cosmology, the seat of human identity and consciousness is the soul, thus it is the soul 
that is aware, learns, and knows. But just as the metaphysical and the ethical, and the 
metaphysical and the epistemological, and the ethical and the epistemological are all 
connected in Islamic thought, so, too, are the material and the metaphysical, and the 
material and the ethical, and the material and the epistemological. As we saw in Chapter 
Two, the material reality of this world (ʿālam al-mulk) has a purpose; it reflects the 
meanings found in the spiritual realm (ʿālam al-malakūt) that is layered upon it and acts 
as a ladder to reach it. Both of these realms are a creation of God and thus in His control, 
bearing a relationship to Him as all parts of His creation do. While both the heart and the 
body are connected to their Creator, the heart’s “relationship is of a loftier nature than 
that of any of the physical members of the body,” and it is therefore superior to them.387 
Yet we are in need of the body on our path to cultivate the heart: the seat of human 
identity might be the soul, but the body is the vessel of the soul in this life. A soul’s body 
“is its mount that it rides upon and its means by which it strives [toward its destination]” 
and, like “the mount for the physical body on its way to pilgrimage,” or “the water skin 
that is necessary for the body to make its journey,” it is a necessary part of the journey to 
the hereafter that, if cast aside, leads to failure.388 The body is a means whose use is 
decreed by God, thus it is forbidden for one to neglect the body or expose it to 
destruction.389 Since the body itself is a means on the path to the hereafter, those things 
that help us order our physical lives contribute to our overall spiritual journey. In 
classifying purely material sciences like medicine, Imām al-Ghazālī writes: “Each of the 
sciences whose aim is the well-being of the physical body is thus a facet of the general 
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well-being of the means of traveling the path; there is no doubt that the science of 
medicine is one aspect of this, for it is necessary for maintaining bodily health.”390  
The true scholars take the means God has given them, including the physical, 
regulating them with respect and care - they do not make physical life the center of their 
existence, but “keep the company of this world with their physical bodies, while their 
souls are conjoined to the loftiest abode.”391 Such a person’s interior and exterior life are 
in harmony: “his demeanor reflects [his] apprehension [of God], as does his clothing, his 
bearing, his action and repose, his manner of discourse and his silence” such that “no one 
regards him without being reminded of God. His very appearance is proof of his earnest 
comportment.”392 The seeker of knowledge ought to make this his goal; there is much 
guidance in the example of the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, of his Companions, and of their heirs, the 
scholars, to help him or her along in this. In this section, we will review some of the 
recommendations for organizing one’s physical life found in Islamic ethics as they 
pertain specifically to acquiring knowledge. These means, as we will see, are equally 
liable to be labeled as prelogical, though they, too, bear their proper place in the Islamic 
worldview.  
5.4.2.   Moderation in Everything  
One of the principles of Islamic ethics that can be applied across all aspects of 
material life is that the believer and, in particular, the seeker of knowledge, should temper 
every choice they make and action they take with moderation. The basis for an Islamic 
ethic of moderation can be found in verse [2:143] of the Qur’ān, which makes reference 
to the “middle way” that is such a pervasive theme in Islamic thought, stating: “And thus 
have We willed you to be a community of the middle way, so that [with your lives] you 
might bear witness to the truth before all mankind, and that the Apostle might bear 
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witness to it before you...”393 This gives Qur’ānic evidence for the connection between 
the middle way and the witnessing of truth - that is, knowing or knowledge. A further 
connection between the two ideas (moderation and knowledge) occurs in verse [68:28], 
where the root for the word “middle” (wa - sa - ṭa) is used to mean “right-minded” or 
wise (awsaṭuhum).394 Moderation is a position of wisdom, and it ought to be applied by 
the wise in every aspect of their existence, whether material, social, or spiritual. Evidence 
for this is found throughout the Prophetic tradition - extremism is thus utterly 
incompatible with that tradition.  
The scholars uphold the ethic of moderation; amongst the characteristics of the 
true scholar is  
“that he inclines not toward extravagance in his food and beverages, nor elegance in his 
clothing, nor opulence in his furnishings or residence. Rather he prefers moderation in all 
that; in this he is similar to the predecessors (r) and he inclines toward simple sufficiency 
with the minimum in everything. Whenever his inclination in the direction of penury 
increases, his proximity to God increases, and his rank among the scholars of the hereafter 
becomes elevated.”395 
 
If the scholars did not live thus, they would lead the masses astray, giving the less 
educated the excuse that the wise live wasteful, extravagant lives, so why should those 
who possess less knowledge than them avoid such behavior?396 Censuring those scholars 
who shamelessly lead lavish lives, Ḥātim b. al-Aṣamm said: “O malicious scholars! 
When the uneducated multitudes who fight like dogs over the world and thirst for its 
goods see the likes of you, they proclaim, ‘The [venerable] scholar lives thus! I am 
certainly no worse than he.’”397 This holds for those who study the religious sciences as 
well, not just those who have mastered them: the people on the path of knowledge 
become models for the rest of society, therefore the normal injunction for Muslims to 
avoid excess and waste applies doubly for them. While “self-adornment is permissible,” 
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395 Al-Ghazālī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” 244. For translation, see: Al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 193. 
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there is a risk in it of becoming attached to worldly, which will drag one off the path of 
healthy intentionality and chain one to the life of this world when one should be seeking 
the next.398 Only those with extreme self-control can resist the pull of even the 
permissible blessings of earthly life.399 Food is one of these permissible blessings that, 
when not moderated, has a negative effect on the soul. Seekers of knowledge take care to 
avoid such setbacks in order to be more successful on the path of knowledge; they follow 
the example of the scholars of old, like Imām Al-Shāfiʿī, who said: “I have not satiated 
myself for sixteen years, for satiety weighs heavily on the body, hardens the heart, 
diminishes intelligence, induces sleep, and weakens one’s capacity for devotions.”400 
They eat only of that which is permissible, otherwise they face the possibility of having 
their work corrupted by their source of energy, for food is nothing more than a means to 
an end.401 Moderation and ethical consciousness in eating, then, is a tool of knowledge 
acquisition in the Islamic matrix of material, ethical, and epistemological. 
Moderation is not limited to consumption of material goods, however; it also 
involves things as quotidian as excess mirth. Imām al-Ghazālī cites a statement of one of 
the predecessors, who said that “when a scholar laughs out loud, he spits out a bit of 
knowledge.”402 This metaphor directly implies a reduction in the knowledge of one who 
does not comport him or herself with moderation in happiness. This may seem like an 
extreme limitation, Imām ʿAlī explains the potential reasoning behind it well when he 
instructs those on the path of knowledge: “When you hear of knowledge, keep it close, 
and do not associate it with levity and empty discourse, lest hearts reject and discard 
it.”403 The work both students and scholars are involved in is own of great nobility, and 
nobility brings with it a degree of restraint and discretion. To abandon this is to lower the 
station of knowledge in the eyes of the public. It is also a sign of the limitations of one’s 
own wisdom - an indication of a lack of knowledge.  
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5.4.3.   Little Speech 
The idea of moderation in mirth ties into what one might call the ethic of the 
tongue: in Islamic thought, speech is considered action and people are held to account for 
the things they say. Take, for example, the ḥadīth in which the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said: “Every 
word uttered by a son of Adam will be against him, not in his favor, except three [things 
he said], enjoining worthy conduct, forbidding that which is contemptible, and 
remembering God.”404 Thus there is an entire tradition in Islamic thought of maintaining 
great caution and control of what one’s speech. The reason for this is that “vain discourse 
and affected speech, losing oneself in laughter, and vehemence in demeanor and 
speech...are signs of wantonness, a [false] sense of security, and heedlessness of the 
horrific extent of God’s chastisement and the severity of His wrath.”405 The 
knowledgeable are more aware than others of the reasons for and content of this ethical 
practice. Perhaps it is for that reason that Imām al-Ghazālī, in multiple locations, equates 
silence with knowledge, opining that “whoever has been given silence and ascetic 
[detachment], has been given knowledge in its totality.”406  
We have seen that the ability to say “I do not know” is a protection for the 
scholar; the true scholars further protect themselves and the knowledge they convey by 
exercising great discretion in speech. It was reported that:  
“Imām al-Shāfiʿī (r) was once questioned concerning a certain matter on which he remained 
silent. So it was said to him, ‘Are you not going to respond, may God bless you?’ To which 
he responded, ‘Not until I know whether the merit resides in my silence or in the response [to 
your question].’”407  
 
It is right that the scholars in particular should be careful in controlling their tongues, for 
they are called upon to teach, to preach, and to guide through their speech; moreover, 
they are given the authority to step in and do so more freely than others. Thus, for them, 
the inclination to speak, even when silence may be preferable, is stronger and more 
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difficult to resist than it is for others. Relating a narration from Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī’s Qūt 
al-Qulūb, Imām al-Ghazālī writes that: 
“Among the temptations for the scholar is that speech becomes more beloved to him than 
attentively listening. Speech allows for eloquent expression and superfluous embellishment, 
and leaves the speaker susceptible to error; whereas in thoughtful silence there is integrity 
and knowledge.”408 
 
It is a trope of Islamic ethics that the tongue is one of the most difficult limbs to control 
for mankind;409 this applies doubly for those on the path of knowledge, for whom 
arrogance and ostentation are both a strong impulse and a great risk.410 Ideally, the further 
they travel on that path, the more skilled they become at controlling their speech, for 
“when knowledge increases, discourse decreases.”411 Imām al-Ghazālī sets the same 
example in his texts, even limiting his own exposition in places. He writes at one point: 
“let us elaborate no more on this; the aim in realizing the truth of a matter is brevity in 
speech and reaching the goal promptly, not drawn-out expositions.”412 When questioned, 
true scholars are so vigilant in their heedfulness that they venture into evasiveness at 
times. The true “scholar is the one who, when questioned on a matter [of religion], feels 
as though he were having a molar removed.”413 
Those who can maintain silence when necessary are rewarded just as much as one 
who speaks the truth in teaching,414 but reward is not the only thing there is to be gained 
by proper conduct in speech acts: by controlling the tongue, one can also gain in wisdom 
and knowledge. As we mentioned, silence is directly equated with knowledge and 
realization;415 one who practices the former is likely to gain in the latter. A commonsense 
reason for this is that those who are silent, just like those who are humble, are open to 
learning. A reason that is not as familiar to the modern mind is that the moral exercise of 
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silence is very difficult on the ego, and experiential knowledge can only be achieved 
when the ego is suppressed.416  
5.4.4.   Little Sleep  
Another realm of daily life in which regulation of the physical body facilitates 
knowledge acquisition is that of sleep. The idea of moderation in sleep, like that of 
speech, is firmly established in prophetic traditions and in the Islamic ethical system in 
general. The Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص is reported to have said to one of his Companions: “O so and so, 
do not sleep much at night, for a large quantity of sleep at night will leave its owner a 
poor man on Resurrection Day.”417 Time is the capital of humankind; they either use it 
effectively in this life to earn paradise in the hereafter or they spend it fruitlessly.418 A 
person’s nights account for much of that time, and though the physical body and the 
appetitive soul both enjoy sleep, some portion of that time can be saved - set aside for 
better use. As humans, time is our “most precious possession,” and wasting it is both 
immoral and unwise.419 Thus, sleeping through the entire night could be described as 
heedlessness.420 Imām al-Shāfiʿī yet again provides the model for us in this aspect of 
moderation. He used to “divide the night into three parts: a third for the study of 
knowledge, a third for prayer, and a third for sleep.”421 This division of the night between 
fulfilling physical needs, ritual worship, and knowledge acquisition is the epitome of 
balance; it also joins the various means by which the path of knowledge is traversed. 
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A Poor Choice of Words 
The mental processes discussed above are fairly straightforward means of 
learning; they are in line with modern educational theories and, in the minds of thinkers 
like Rosenthal and Von Grunebaum, are worthy of being called “rational” or “logical.” 
But in Chapters Four and Five, we found such means paired with others, equally integral 
to an Islamic theory of education but which may be labeled “prelogical” or “irrational.”422 
Imām al-Ghazālī pairs these seamlessly, as they all constitute part of his worldview: 
“Know that the sciences...differ in their manner of attainment. Sometimes they come upon the 
heart as though something were flung into it from a source it knows not. At other times they 
are gained through deduction (istidlāl) and study. That which is not attained by way of 
acquisition nor through artful proof is called general inspiration (ilhām), and that which is 
attained through inference is called reflection (iʿtibār) and mental perception (istabṣār).”423 
 
Each of these fall into our binary division of the sources of knowledge into reason and 
revelation: deduction, study, reflection, and perception are functions of the intellect, 
while inspiration is a kind of revelation. Note that Imām al-Ghazālī touches on each of 
these means by which knowledge is attained without drawing any rational distinction 
between them, or singling out one over others as being more efficacious. The only 
difference is that, in the case of inspiration, the knowledge enters the heart through some 
function of the unseen world, while in the case of mental thought processes, the learner is 
aware of the action of the intellect in pursuit of knowledge.  
The Term is Pejorative 
It is fair to say that gaining knowledge through revelation is not a rational process 
in that it does not involve reasoning, or that it is not logical in that it is not a function of 
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human deduction at work. But to apply the terms “prelogical” and “irrational” to 
revelation, or to the other secondary means of learning that open the doors to revelation, 
such as spiritual purification or ethical behavior, is unfair. The reason for this is that such 
terms have become pejorative in our time, which, at least in Western educational 
environments, still carries the marks of positivism and is largely characterized by a 
combination of scientism and materialism.424 If my reader doubts that the term was meant 
pejoratively, let him or her consider the fact that Von Grunebaum uses the term 
“magical” synonymously with “prelogical.”425 In much the same way, Rosenthal uses the 
term “supernatural’ synonymously with “irrational,” and places both of these in 
opposition to the descriptors “rational” and “material.”426 This term, like irrational and 
pre-logical, though philosophically straightforward, carries a negative connotation in our 
time. Since modern academic thought sits under the shadow of the information age, its 
conception of knowledge has little to do with metaphysical realities - indeed, the idea of a 
metaphysic is meaningless.427 Thus whatever is “material” is “rational” and “logical,” 
and anything other than that (i.e. immaterial) is “irrational,” “supernatural,” “magical,” 
and “prelogical.” From such a position, one cannot adhere to the view that the Preserved 
Tablet contains the knowledge of all created things, that this is then reflected in existent 
reality, which is perceived and understood by man. Much less can one accommodate the 
idea that God might fold the process, and directly reveal the content of the Tablet to 
man’s heart. Not only could one not accept these understandings of reality - a physicalist 
worldview would have to label them as nonsense. The cosmologies differ, thus their 
epistemologies will necessarily differ as well.  
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Imām al-Ghazālī’s Means of Knowledge Acquisition as Causally Appropriate within his 
Metaphysic 
This brings us to another reason why such labels are inaccurate: if the means 
Imām al-Ghazālī includes in his epistemology are efficacious in the context of his 
metaphysic, his recommendation that those means be used to arrive at their proper ends is 
not “irrational.” To take a means to achieve something when the causation holds within 
one’s own metaphysic is not an irrational act, it is in fact rational. But Rosenthal and Von 
Grunebaum, in describing them they way they have, and those who take similar positions 
to them, do not admit the possibility of a different metaphysic. Thus they assume the 
ignorance or irrationality of the one who believes as Imām al-Ghazālī does - belief, to 
them, is an anathema. What they fail to see, however, is that their understanding of 
knowledge is no less founded on faith: their faith in the idea that materialism and 
scientism are true to reality. The suggestion that means like “the recitation of pious 
formulae” are “primitive” is nothing more than philosophical prejudice.428 The idea that 
one can have an epistemology devoid of metaphysical contentions works out well for 
physicalists, but for anyone who sees the world differently, it is exclusionary and 
unreasonable.   
Imām al-Ghazālī’s Response  
One’s Ignorance of a Phenomenon does not Entail its Non-existence 
Imām al-Ghazālī does not overlook the possibility of objections from perspectives 
like this: he has responses for those who deny the existence of that which they have not 
experienced. He warns his reader that “some men endowed with intellect have rejected 
the things perceptible to the prophetic power and considered them to be wildly 
improbably. That is the very essence of ignorance! For such a man has no supporting 
reason except it is a stage he himself has not attained and for him it does not exist: so he 
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supposes that it does not exist in itself.”429 There are several ways of coming to know the 
unseen elements of the Imām al-Ghazālī’s epistemology, either through the intellect, 
accepting the word of those who transmit revealed knowledge, or through personal 
spiritual experience. Those who deny the existence of higher modes of knowing simply 
because they have not experienced such a thing themselves are not believed to be 
knowledgeable; they are blind to the reality of whatever is beyond them.430 The example 
of dreams is a useful in countering their argument. Imām al-Ghazālī explains that if a 
person who had never had a dream before had the experience described to him, and was 
told that “there are some men who fall down unconscious as though they were dead, and 
their perception, hearing and sight leave them, and they then perceive what is ‘hidden,’ 
he would deny it and give apodeictic proof of its impossibility by saying: ‘The sensory 
powers are the causes of perception.’”431 This man would, however, be wrong, since such 
a thing is possible and is widely known to occur. One might retort that while the 
existence of dreams is demonstrated to be true through the collective knowledge of 
society, which recognizes it due to its being commonly experienced by the members of 
society. I would respond to this that the kind of revealed knowledge that is inspiration has 
been similarly demonstrated, just not in Western society. Throughout the Islamic 
civilization, even up until today in Muslim countries, the reality of such inspiration is 
commonly acknowledged. Thus it is not pre-logical for scholars of the Islamic 
civilization to take these means as a part of their understanding of reality, and to not 
“attempt to rationalize these folkways.”432 Imām al-Ghazālī takes up a similar line of 
reasoning, challenging those who claim to take their beliefs from empirical proofs alone:  
“You do not limit yourself to believing what you have experienced. On the contrary, you 
have listened to the reports of experienced men and have unquestioningly accepted their 
statements. Listen, therefore, to the utterances of the prophets: for they have indeed 
experienced and seen what is true in all that revelation has brought us. Follow in their path, 
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and you will perceive some of that by direct vision...even if you have had no such experience, 
your reason peremptorily judges it necessary to believe and follow the experienced.”433 
 
If one considers the fact that one possesses the capacity of reason - which Imām al-
Ghazālī describes as a higher form of sight - and that this capacity is beyond or above 
that of physical sight, one can extrapolate from this to a still higher mode of knowing and 
seeing reality. Imām al-Ghazālī describes the knowledge derived from prophecy this way, 
and points out that just as the intellect perceives intelligibles beyond the power of 
physical eyesight, the “prophetic power” grasps intelligibles beyond the reach of the 
intellect.434 The weakness of the position of a person who denies the existence of such 
metaphysical realities or their ability to be perceived through prophecy is exposed when 
we consider that, if they were described using a different “mode of expression” or 
cultural association, that person would be much more liable to accept them (as it is with 
the concept of dreaming versus that of prophecy).435 This is particularly ironic because 
true dreams themselves are described as being one forty-sixth of prophecy in the Islamic 
tradition.436  
Spiritual Realities have Properties and Effects 
As for those who deny the efficacy of so-called “archaic” means of knowledge 
acquisition,437 Imām al-Ghazālī has a response for them as well. Although Von 
Grunebaum writes them off as “folkways,” the ritualistic elements of faith have effects 
and properties just as other physical phenomena have effects and properties.438 Modern 
thinkers will often adopt this attitude toward religious phenomena, because they, like the 
“philosophers” Imām al-Ghazālī addresses, see their own understanding of the universe 
and experience as the only accurate portrayal of reality and dismiss everything outside of 
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their own perspective as being impossible.439 Yet there is no difference between the 
physical properties the natural philosopher accepts and the “properties [existing] in the 
number of rakʿas, the throwing of stones, the number of the principal ceremonies of the 
pilgrimage, and the other prescriptions of revelation.”440 Moreover, there are existent 
physical phenomena whose causes and effects are unclear and whose properties are 
unknown. Would the natural philosopher (the Physicalist) deny the existence of those 
physical realities simply because they are not yet understood?441 If he or she would not, 
then it is mere narrow-mindedness to deny the existence of metaphysical phenomena or 
mock their pursuit as meaningless.442 A sick man’s lack of understanding about the 
function of a medication does not prevent him from taking the treatment recommended 
by a health professional, yet when it comes to religious professionals (scholars) and their 
recommendations for his spiritual health, his experience and not theirs becomes the 
determining factor.443 For anyone who takes this position, Imām al-Ghazālī has a 
warning: “beware, lest your portion of knowledge be the denial of everything that 
exceeds the confines of your own limits. Therein have perished the pedantic scholars who 
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